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CALIFORNIA'S UNCOMMON COMMON LAW
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
William R. Shafton*
Modem society seems increasingly to expose [people] to..
. group injuries for which individually they are in a poor
position to seek legal redress, either because they do not
know enough or because such redress is disproportionately
expensive. If each is left to assert his rights alone.., there
will at best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if
there is any at all.

. .

. The problem of fashioning an

effective and inclusive group remedy is thus a major one.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Paul Miller was never the same after being physically assaulted
in 1989.2 The assault left him with head injuries that caused a
permanent mental disability. This unfortunate disability entitled Mr.
Miller to receive government benefits that he directly deposited into
his checking account.' Mr. Miller, however, ran into trouble when
his bank, Bank of America, mistakenly credited extra money into his
account that he proceeded to spend.' Without Mr. Miller's consent,
Bank of America withdrew his government benefits to offset the
.J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School; B.A., Oberlin College. I am deeply
grateful for the dedication and diligence of Professor Georgene Vairo and the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review editors and staff, without whom this Article would have been relegated to an
unpublished file on my hard drive. Most importantly, to my beautiful wife and children, thank
you for allowing me to complete this Article by waiving what would have undoubtedly been a
successful Unfair Competition claim against the law review.
1. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,

8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 686 (1941).
2. Miller v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., No. CGC-99-301917, 2004 WL 3153009, at *2
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2004).
3. Id. at *2-3. The bank assured him that his "benefit payments would be safe, convenient,
and available when needed through direct deposit." Id. at *3.
4. Id. at *3.
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bank's error. This left his account with a deficit balance for which
the bank charged overdraft fees." 5 Mr. Miller filed suit against Bank
of America, arguing that the bank's seizure of his benefits was
improper under California law and seeking to recover the allegedly
improper fees.6 While the California Supreme Court will soon
review whether a bank may properly withdraw government benefit
funds from its customer accounts to satisfy overdraft charges,7 Mr.
Miller's case illustrates a different issue.
Mr. Miller was not the only customer who had their benefit
monies seized by Bank of America. In fact, Bank of America
maintains accounts for over a million customers who have their
government benefit checks directly deposited into their accounts.8
Given that Mr. Miller lived off of his disability checks, he was not in
a position to single-handedly bankroll litigation against Bank of
America for the alleged improprieties that resulted in relatively little
pecuniary loss to him. Instead, he and a handful of other lead
plaintiffs brought claims on behalf of themselves as well as more
than a million other similarly situated customers who were subject to
the same allegedly wrongful acts by marshalling the utility of three
different California statutes: California Code of Civil Procedure
("CCP") section 382 (the primary statute that authorizes class
actions),9 the Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") (an
alternative mechanism for class action claims involving unfair
consumer transactions),"° and the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL")
(which, until 2004, provided for representative actions seeking
equitable relief for illegal, fraudulent, or unfair business practices)."
California has consistently embraced an equitable approach for
adjudicating claims involving questions of general interest or claims
5. Id, at *3, *8. The bank charged up to $160 per day in overdraft or non-sufficient funds
fees. Id. at *8.
6. Id. at *1.
7. Miller v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 223 (Ct. App. 2006), cert. granted,
154 P.3d 997 (Cal. 2007).
8. Respondent's Petition for Review at 4, Miller v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 154 P.3d 997
(Cal. 2007) (No. S149178).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (Deering 2007). For a detailed discussion of section 382,
see infra Part II.
10. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-84 (Deering 2007). For further discussion of the CLRA, see
infra Part IV.
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-09 (Deering 2007). For additional discussion of the
UCL, see infra Parts IV-V.
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involving numerous parties. In that vein, the California legislature in
1872 enacted section 382, which "rests upon considerations of
necessity and paramount convenience, and was adopted to prevent a
failure of justice."' 2 Section 382, as well as the CLRA, are founded
on California's long-standing policy of ensuring that justice is served
even where "numerous parties suffer injury of insufficient size to
warrant individual action" that would otherwise lead to an "unjust
advantage to the wrongdoer." 3
This Article explores how plaintiffs like Mr. Miller, who do not
have the funds to file claims for alleged wrongdoings and/or who
have suffered a small pecuniary loss, invoke the class action
mechanisms available to them in California and how those
mechanisms vary from those available in federal courts. More
specifically, Part II of this Article begins with a historical perspective
on the development of California's class action jurisprudence and
then introduces the foundational requirements for class certification
in California pursuant to section 382. This section also includes
examples of seminal and noteworthy California cases discussing
these requirements and makes some comparisons of these
requirements to the approach outlined in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 ("Rule 23")." Next, Part III highlights some specific
distinctions between California and federal class action litigation
practice, including statutes of limitations and appellate review of
class certification. Part IV focuses on the CLRA and the UCL and
how these two vehicles have furthered the state's policies favoring
representative actions. Finally, Part V explores practitioners' and
commentators' observations of California's current class action
litigation climate. In addition, this section provides a cursory review
of the initial impact that the Class Action Fairness Act 15 ("CAFA")
has had on the parties who bring or defend the class action claims.
Ultimately, this Article suggests that California class action
practice and procedure, while perhaps not remarkably different than
12. Bernhard v. Wall, 194 P. 1040, 1048 (Cal. 1921) (quoting 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PLEADING & PRACTICE 629 (William M. McKinney ed., Long Island, N.Y., Edward Thompson
Co. 1899)); see also Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 198 P.2d 514 (Cal. 1948)
(discussing the doctrine of virtual representation).
13. Blue Chip Stamps v. Super Ct., 556 P.2d 755, 758 (Cal. 1976).
14. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
15. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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federal practice, does provide litigants with some subtle differences
that must be taken into account. After exploring whether California
should appropriately be considered a "judicial hellhole,"'' 6 this
Article concludes with a reflection on the history and the future of
equitable class action adjudication in California.

II.

AN OVERVIEW OF CLASS CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA AND A COMPARISON TO FEDERAL STANDARDS

While each jurisdiction sets out its own prerequisites for
maintaining a class action, the typical class action litigation cycle is
relatively universal. The litigation generally begins when a plaintiff,
as the class representative, files a complaint on behalf of herself and
other similarly situated plaintiffs who are not actually named in the
complaint (the represented parties). 7 In the earliest stage of
litigation, the court uses the jurisdiction's class certification
requirements to determine whether the plaintiff may maintain the
action on behalf of the purported class members. For instance, many
jurisdictions require that the plaintiff show that her claims are
factually and/or legally similar to the claims of the represented
parties, that the representative's counsel can adequately represent the
interests of all parties, and that the number of represented parties at
issue are such that it is impractical to join them all. 8
16. A "judicial hellhole" (a phrase coined and subsequently trademarked by the American
Tort Reform Association) describes a jurisdiction "where judges systematically apply laws and
court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner, generally against defendants in civil
lawsuit." AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, at ii (2007), http://www.atra.org/
reports/hellholes/ report.pdf [hereinafter 2007 ATRA REPORT]. A judicial hellhole might also
keep a case in its jurisdiction "even where it would be more appropriately maintained elsewhere."
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Taking a Stand Against Lawlessness in American Courts: How Trial
Court Judges and Appellate Justices Can Protect Their Courts from Becoming Judicial
Hellholes, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215, 230-31 (2003).

17. Although much less common, a defendant class action arises when a representative
defendant defends on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated parties. See Robert R.
Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant Class Actions, 32 CONN.L. REV. 1319, 1322-23 (2000)
(noting that defendant class actions are rare).
18. The majority of states have modeled their class action statutes upon Rule 23. See
Michael Connell, Comment, Full Faith and Credit Clause: A Defense to Nationwide Class
Certification?,53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1041, 1042 & n.5 (2002) (noting that the great majority

of state class action statutes mirror Rule 23, but three exceptions exist: (1)California and
Nebraska, which are based upon the Field Code; (2) New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Wisconsin, which have statutes that do not follow Rule 23; and (3) Virginia and Mississippi,
which do not have class action statutes); Kurt A. Schwartz, Note, Due Process and Equitable
Relief in State Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shuts, 68 TEX L. REv
415, 425 n.84 (1989).
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Class certification is a preliminary, procedural matter that is
generally determined prior to any substantive issues. 9 Class
certification can provide the plaintiff with an exceedingly strong
bargaining position given the defendant's potential exposure to each
of the represented plaintiffs."0 Should the plaintiff prevail in the
litigation or settle with the defendant, class members generally are
provided with an opportunity to prove that they are entitled to
receive their share of the award, subject to certain notice
requirements and possible court approval of any settlement.
A. An Early History of California'sClass Action Law

While representative litigation dates as far back as the end of the
twelfth century,2' the development of class action procedures is
generally considered to be an outgrowth of the equity courts'
exception to the rules of compulsory joinder.2" The development of
19. See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 2 P.3d 27, 34 (Cal. 2000) (noting that in California class
certification is a procedural issue that does not involve the merits of the case, barring a showing
that fairness and efficiency demand an examination of the legal sufficiency of the claims).
"[N]othing prevents a court from weeding out legally meritless suits prior to certification via a
defendant's demurrer or pretrial motion." Id. Cf Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156,
177 (1974) ("[N]othing in either the language or history of Rule 23 ... gives a [federal] court any
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it
may be maintained as a class action."). Some commentators have suggested that courts should be
free to conduct an examination of the merits rather than be forced to certify meritless class action
claims. See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis
Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 370 (1996) (discussing how some
federal courts continue to conduct a merit based inquiry despite the holding of Eisen); Douglas
M. Towns, Merit-Based Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV.
1001, 1044 (1992). Practically, a court must often make factual determinations when ruling on
whether or not to certify the case. See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 23.84 n.9 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the Second Circuit's adoption of "the view that
courts may, indeed must, consider merits issues to the extent they are necessary to certification
determinations" (citing Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 471
F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006)).
20. See Georgene Vairo, Judicialv. CongressionalFederalism: The Implications of the New
Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1559, 1588-90 (2000) (exploring commentators' perspectives on whether class action
certification should be discouraged to avoid a form of legalized blackmail).
21. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in
Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 688 (1997). Yeazell discusses an 1199 case from the
court of the Archbishop of Canterbury in which the rector of a parish sued four parishioners as
representatives of all parishioners. Id. The rector sought to have the parishioners carry the bodies
of their dead several miles to a place where the rector could bury the dead for a fee. Id.
22. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group
Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067,
1067-68 (1980) (noting how the Chancery courts of the seventeenth century developed
innovative means to adjudicate group claims in rural communities).
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representative actions was furthered by the Field Code,23 which New
York was the first to adopt in 1848.24 The New York legislature then
amended the code in 1849 to include the first state statutory language
authorizing class actions.25
In 1850, the same year that California joined the Union,26 the

California Supreme Court heard its first class action case and
adopted language similar to the Field Code in order to ensure that
parties' rights could be enforced where there would not otherwise be
a remedy.27 The court avoided a stringent adherence to strict party
joinder rules and instead followed the lead of the Field Code, which
provided that a single plaintiff could bring a claim on behalf of
others not present before the court where the claim involved a

question "of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
the parties [were] numerous, and it [was] impracticable to bring them
28
all before the court.
This open-door policy towards representative actions carried
over to California's section 382, which utilized the same language in

the Field Code in order to provide a remedy where, for example,
"numerous parties suffer injury of insufficient size to warrant
individual action. ' 29 Congress employed the Field Code language in
Federal Equity Rule 38, "the first federal codification of class action

23. In the mid-nineteenth century, legal reformer David Dudley Field "drafted a streamlined
model code, which in its tightly packed 70 pages, included sections on civil law, procedure,
political law and penal law." Michael A.S. Newman, Reforming Class Action, L.A. DAILY J.,
Nov. 20, 2007, at 4. In drafting his code, Field's "avowed goal was to make the law 'accessible
to the common man' by paring away the tangled accretion of hundreds of years of common law."
Id. (quoting David Dudley Field). The Field Code served as a model for the 1938 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law
World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435, 506 (2000).
24. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit
Structurefrom the Field Code to the FederalRules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 n. 13 (1989).
25. Id. at 48 n.138.
26. See KEVIN STARR, CALIFORNIA: A HISTORY, at xviii (2005).
27. Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 55, 67-68 (1850).
28. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (Deering 2007). The California legislature adopted the
language from the Field Code in 1851, which later became the source for California's section
382. See THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 (Theodore H. Hittell ed.,
Sumner Whitney 1868).
29. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Super. Ct., 556 P.2d 755, 758 (Cal. 1976).
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procedures."3 In 1938, when law and equity merged in the federal
courts, Congress embodied Rule 38's principles in Rule 23. 3'
Despite the flexible approach to class action litigation, judges
and lawmakers recognized that "group action is also capable of
injustice. 32 Therefore, courts have employed certain criteria to
ensure that the mechanism designed to remedy injustice does not
itself become a vehicle for abuse.33 The balance of this section
explores those procedural safeguards, which also serve to ensure
fairness and protect the absent class member's due process rights.34
B. Requirementsfor Asserting a Class Action Pursuantto
California's Code of Civil ProcedureSection 382
The language of CCP section 382 goes no further than to declare
that "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of
many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue
or defend for the benefit of all."35 Notably absent from section 382
are any procedural guidelines for class actions or any specific criteria
designating which class actions can be maintained.36
In the early 1970s, the California legislature passed the CLRA,
which provided its own exclusive procedures, based upon Rule 23,
for asserting and maintaining consumer class actions in California.37
California was one of the few states that did not adopt Rule 23 as its
general class action statute,38 but the California Supreme Court has
judicially adopted certain provisions of Rule 23 and advised courts to

30. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle Continues, 31 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 373, 374 (1998).
31.

See ELIZABETH J. CABRASER ET AL., CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTIONS PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 1.01 (2007); For a more detailed discussion of Rule 23 see Part II.B.2.
32. Blue Chip Stamps, 556 P.2d at 758.
33. See Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 425 (Ct. App. 1993) (analyzing
previous class action cases to establish amount of damages, group litigant benefits, and court
benefits as factors for class certification).
34. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 19, 23.02.
35. CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 382 (Deering 2007).
36. In 2002, the California Judicial Council issued a set of rules for management of class
action litigation that regulates class notice, motions to certify or decertify the class, discovery
procedures to identify class members, and settlement and dismissal of class actions. See CAL. R.
CT. 3.760-771.
37. See infra Part IV.
38.

CABRASERETAL., supra note 31.
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look to the federal approach when there is no California law on
point.3 9 As explained below, California's common law approach

now requires that a party seeking class certification under section
382 show that an ascertainable class exists and that there is a

"community of interest" among class members.
1. Ascertainable Class

A final judgment in a class action can preclude absent class
members from later asserting their own claims or defenses against
the adverse party.4 1 Given this potentially preclusive effect of a class

action, courts must be able to ascertain who is going to be bound by
a class action judgment. 2 Thus, a plaintiff in California must show
that there is an objectively identifiable class of litigants who have a
cause of action against the defendant, although the plaintiff need not

prove the existence of specific class members or identify all class
members by name. 3 California courts decide whether the plaintiff
has met her burden of proving ascertainability by looking at a
number of factors, including the class definition itself, the size of the
purported class, and the available means of identifying class

members.44
a. The class definition
The question of whether a class can be logically ascertained
begins with how the plaintiff defines the class.4 5 However, a well-

39. See Vasquez v. Super. Ct., 484 P.2d 964, 977 (Cal. 1971) ("In the event of a hiatus, rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes procedural devices which a trial court may
find useful." (citing Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 742 (Cal. 1967)).
40. See Daar,433 P.2d at 739.
41. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 717, 719 (2005); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
42. Wolff, supra note 41, at 719.
43. Stephens v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606-07 (Ct. App. 1987).
44. See Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 242 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 (Ct. App.
1987). The extent of the correlation between California's ascertainability requirement and the
federal approach under Rule 23 is discussed later in Part II.B.2.
45. While Rule 23 does not specifically demand a clearly defined class, such a requirement
is hardly unnecessary in federal class action litigation. For example, in Lopez Tijerina v. Henry,
48 F.R.D. 274., 275-77 (D.N.M. 1969), the court found the plaintiff's class definition to be
untenably vague where the plaintiff attempted to define the class as those individuals with
Spanish surnames, individuals of Mexican, Indian and Spanish ancestry, and/or individuals who
speak Spanish as their primary language. Id.; see also 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 19, 1 23.21
(discussing an implied condition of Rule 23 that the class definition must be sufficiently specific).
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defined class may not be sufficient to establish ascertainability if
each putative class member's right to recover is based on unique
facts. For example, in Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses
Association,4 6 the defendant association advertised that it would sell
7,500 tickets to the Rose Bowl football game. 7 After issuing
numbered identification stubs to persons waiting in line in order to
determine who would be eligible to purchase one of the 7,500
tickets, the ticket booth closed after issuing only 1,500 tickets,
leaving some angry stub holders with no opportunity to purchase
tickets.4 8 Four of those stub holders approached the Rose Bowl box
office on the day of the game and attempted to purchase the tickets
but were refused admission. 9 In reviewing the class action brought
by those four individuals on behalf of themselves and the other stub
holders, the court ruled that there was no "reasonable basis for
ascertaining the members of the alleged class."5 The court found
that the purported 6,000 class members were not necessarily a
similarly situated group with common causes of action but instead
had separate and distinct claims.5' The putative class members did
not necessarily share causes of action because each class member
would have to assert that they were refused admission, that the
refusal was wrongful, and that the particular facts of the refusal were
sufficient to entitle them to relief under the applicable statutory
scheme. 2 Therefore, the class was considered unascertainable.53
On the other hand, in the seminal case of Daar v. Yellow Cab
Co.," the plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that the
defendant overcharged its customers during a four year period.55 The
California Supreme Court found that the class, defined as all the
defendant's customers over that four year period, was appropriately

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
and the
54.

198 P.2d 514 (Cal. 1948).
Id.at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 519-20.
Id. at518.
Id. The court also recognized the overlap in such a situation between ascertainability
community of interest. Id. at 519.
433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967).

55. Id. at 736.
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ascertainable.56 The court found the class readily ascertainable
especially because the defendant could produce an accounting that
provided the court with both a ready means of identifying the class
members and the amount of each individual overcharge each class
member suffered.57
Note that a plaintiff need not prove actual injury to every class
member in order to establish ascertainability. In Hicks v. Kaufman &
Broad Home Corp., plaintiff homeowners sued the defendant for
breach of warranty after discovering that new homes contained an
inherent defect that was substantially certain to cause foundation
damage during the life of the homes. 9 Although only some of the
class members' homes had actual damage, the court held that actual
damage may be an element of proof required to show liability, but it
should not be a prerequisite to class membership.6" Indeed, the
merits of the claim may not be considered during the certification
stage.6
b. The class size
In federal courts, in order to establish a class action under Rule
23, the plaintiff must show that "the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable."62 In contrast, the language of
California's section 382 allows a class action "when the question is
one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the
parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court. 6 3 This language suggests that, unlike federal courts bound
by Rule 23, California courts can also allow a class action where it is
in fact practicable to join numerous parties assuming the question is
of common interest involving "many" persons.64 In fact, in Bowles v.

56. Id. at 736-37, 747.
57. Id. at 740.
58. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761 (Ct. App. 2001).
59. Id. at 764.
60. Id. at 765 (noting such reasoning would be circular by making "ascertainability depend
on the outcome of the litigation on the merits").
61. Id. (citing Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 2 P.3d 27, 36-37 (Cal. 2000)).
62. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1). The numerosity requirement is generally met if the number of
class members exceeds forty. See Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001).
63. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (Deering 2007) (emphasis added).
64. See Rose v. City of Hayward, 179 Cal. Rptr. 287, 292 (Ct. App. 1981).
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Superior Court,65 the California Supreme Court approved a class
consisting of just ten trust beneficiaries.66 The court commented that
there is no set number satisfying the requirement that there be
"many" persons and that the class consisting of the ten trust
beneficiaries was "sufficiently broad to cover all the various
beneficiaries."67 Nevertheless, California courts tend to simply
examine whether the class size is sufficiently numerous 68 in part
because California also requires that utilization of the class action
mechanism provides the parties and the court with a substantial
benefit.69
c. The available means of identifying
class members
In determining whether there is an ascertainable class, California
courts will also examine whether there is a reasonable means of
identifying the class members that will not cause excessive expense
or require undue delay.7" Along these lines, the proponent of the
class does not need to individually identify class members in order
Instead,
for the definition of the class to be ascertainable. 7
California courts look to ensure that the class description is
''sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify himself or
herself as having a right to recover based on the description."72
For example, in Reyes v. Board of Supervisors," plaintiff filed a
class action alleging that the defendants, the San Diego Board of
Supervisors and Department of Social Services, improperly denied
benefits to certain class members.74 The defendants asserted that
there would be a high cost of administering any award at the
remedial stage, but the trial court found that government records
65. 283 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1955).
66. Id. at 713.
67. Id. at 712-13.
68. See Fireside Bank v. Super. Ct., 155 P.3d 268, 282 (Cal. 2007); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,
433 P.2d 732, 742 (Cal. 1967); J.P, Morgan & Co. v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 225 (Ct.
App. 2003).
69.
70.
71.
72.

See infra Part 1I.B.3.
See Daar,433 P.2d at 740.
See Stephens v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606-07 (Ct. App. 1987).
Bartold v. Glendale Fed. Bank, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 226, 234 (Ct. App. 2000).

73. 242 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Ct. App. 1987).
74. Id. at 340.
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made the identification of the class relatively easy and did not
involve excessive cost or delay.75 Since there was a reasonable
means of identifying the class that was not unmanageable, the court
found the class to be readily ascertainable.76
Similarly, the California Court of Appeal found an ascertainable
class in Clothesrigger,Inc. v. GTE Corp.77 There, the class consisted
of long-distance telephone subscribers who were charged for one or
more unanswered phone calls. 78 The court felt untroubled by the fact
that the class members would have to identify themselves and prove
their individual damages after resolution of the case on the merits.79
The court found that this individual determination at the remedy
stage did not preclude a finding of an ascertainable class.8"
Therefore, a class is ascertainable if clearly defined and identifiable
without excessive expense or undue delay.
2. Well-defined Community of Interest
The community of interest requirement relates to the language
of section 382 that authorizes class actions where the matter is one of
"common or general interest."'" There is a certain interdependence
between this requirement and the ascertainability requirement, given
that an ascertainable class "depends in turn upon the community of
interest among the class members in the questions of law and fact
involved."82 In order to determine if there is a well-defined
community of interest, California courts look to three factors: (1)
whether common questions of law or fact predominate; (2) whether
the class representative's claims or defenses are typical of the class;
and (3) whether the class representative can adequately represent the
class.83

75. Id. at 346. The court also found that a class action should not be considered
unascertainable out of fear that a problem may exist at the remedial stage. Id. (citing Windham v.
Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 70 (4th Cir. 1977)).
76. Id.
77. 236 Cal. Rptr, 605 (Ct. App. 1987).
78. Id. at610-11.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (Deering 2007).
82. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1967).
83. See Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 28 (Cal. 1981).
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The California approach is loosely analogous to the federal
prerequisites to class actions under Rule 23(a), which requires (1)
numerosity (the class is so large that joinder of all members is
impracticable); (2) commonality (questions of law or fact are
common to the class); (3) typicality (the representative's claims or
defenses are typical of the claims of the represented class members);
and (4) adequacy (the representative parties will fairly and
adequately represent and protect the interests of the class).84
Similarly, the community of interest requirement reflects Rule
23(b)(3), which allows a class action to pursue damages against the
defendant where "questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members."85
a. Do common questions of law or factpredominate?
Part of the underlying purpose of class action litigation is to
provide efficiency both to the parties and the court.86 In order to
further that purpose, courts examine whether common questions of
law or fact predominate. Predominance is a comparative concept,
evaluating the issues that can be resolved jointly and those that
require separate adjudication.8 7 If the individual issues can be
effectively managed, class treatment is not necessarily precluded.88
The commonality requirement is well illustrated by the case of
Collins v. Rocha.89 In that case, the defendant told the 44 plaintiff
farm workers that he would employ them for two weeks.9" The
defendant then drove the plaintiffs 400 miles to a farm, employed
them for a few days, but then terminated their employment without
providing them with a return ride home.9 1 The defendant attacked
the community of interest of the class by questioning whether each
plaintiff relied on the defendant's representations in the same

84.
85.
by Rule
86.
87.

FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
Id. at 23(b)(3); see also infra Part II.C. (discussing the types of class actions authorized
23).
Collins v. Rocha, 497 P.2d 225, 228 (Cal. 1972).
Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 96 P.3d 194, 208 (Cal. 2004).

88. Id. at 200 (citing Richmond, 629 P.2d at 33).
89. 497 P.2d 225.
90. Id. at 226.
91. Id.
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manner, suggesting that each plaintiffs reliance could have led to
varying damages that would have to be proved individually.92 The
court was unconvinced, especially because the plaintiffs had all
gathered together at the same time to listen to the defendant make the
employment offer.93 The plaintiffs therefore could be presumed to
have relied on the defendant's one-time representation. 4 Thus, the
court held that common questions of fact existed to sufficiently
support a community of interest because each class member's right
to recover did not require separate adjudication of each member's
claim, even though individual class members could be separately
required to prove damages after judgment.95
On the other hand, the community of interest requirement will
likely not be satisfied if each individual class member's right to
recover requires separate adjudication of each class member's claim.
For example, in City of San Jose v. Superior Court,96 the plaintiffs
brought a class action against the city for inverse condemnation and
nuisance, alleging that the flight patterns at a nearby municipal
airport caused a diminution of their property values.97 In San Jose,
the defendant's liability to class members could not be determined as
a whole but instead required an examination of facts that were
particular to each individual plaintiff.98 Thus, because there were "no
common questions of law and fact," the court held that there was an
insufficient community of interest and class certification was
improper.99
b. Are the class representativesclaims or defenses
typical of the class?
The typicality requirement, a prerequisite in both California and
federal class actions, seeks to protect the due process rights of absent
class members by ensuring that the class representative will pursue
92. Id.
93. Id. at 227.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 228.
96. 525 P.2d 701 (Cal. 1974).
97. Id. at 704-05.
98. Id. at 710 (noting that the impact of aircraft noise on each individual property varies
depending on the use of the land and that the noise level from the planes would not be
determinative in evaluating whether an actionable nuisance existed).
99. Id.
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the action vigorously, which is more likely to occur if the interests of
the members and the representative are unified.'0 0
A class representative's actual membership in the class isthe
starting point for a typicality analysis. For example, in Caro v.
Procter & Gamble Co.,' the plaintiff brought a CLRA class action
claiming that the defendant engaged in a fraudulent and deceitful
business practice by representing that its "Citrus Hill" orange juice
was "fresh" when it was in fact reconstituted from frozen
concentrate. 2 While the plaintiff brought the claim on behalf of
those who were deceived by the defendant's deceptive labeling and
advertising, the plaintiff himself did not think that the orange juice
was "fresh."'0 3 Therefore, he did not have claims that were typical of
the class.0 4
Furthermore, if a class action is brought against multiple
defendants, the representative must have a claim against each
defendant. 5 This requirement is exemplified by the case of Hart v.
Alameda County. 6 There, plaintiff Hart, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, brought a class action against twenty-five
different California counties for the return of unused jury fee
deposits.0 7 However, Hart only had individual claims against three
of the twenty-five counties.'0 8 The court ruled that the representative
can only maintain claims for which she actually has a cause of
action. 9 If the representative does not have a personal cause of
action against each defendant, the representative's claims cannot be
considered to be typical of the class." 0

100. 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1764 (3d ed.
2007).
101. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (Ct. App. 1993).
102. Id. at 421.
103. Id. at 430.
104. Id. at 431.
105. Bait. Football Club, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 215 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 (Ct. App. 1985).
106. 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Ct. App. 1999).
107. Id. at 389.
108. Id. at 391.
109. Id.

110. Id.
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c. Do the class representativesadequately
represent the class?

The requirements of typicality and adequacy of representation
are often related given their similar due process considerations. A
plaintiff in both California courts under section 382 and federal
courts under Rule 23 must show that the class representative will
adequately represent the class. "Adequate representation is the

foundation of all representative actions and embodies the due process
requirement that each litigant is entitled to his or her day in court.""'1
The focus of this requirement in California tends to be twofold: (1)
whether the representative plaintiff has any interests that are

antagonistic to the class; and (2) whether 12the plaintiffs attorney is
qualified to adequately represent the class.'
i. The representative's interests may not be
antagonistic to the class
The representative's claims should not be inconsistent with the

claims of the other class members." 3 In examining this issue,
California courts take a balancing approach by looking at the extent
of the conflicts involved, whether the efficacy of the class action
outweighs the conflict, whether there are ways to limit the impact of
the conflict, and "'any other facts bearing on the fairness with which

the absent class member is represented.'

'5' 4

This balancing approach is exemplified by the case of Capitol
People First v. State Department of Developmental Services,"'

where a number of developmentally disabled plaintiffs brought a
class action against the State for the right to the best services
possible, including the right to live in community settings rather than

111. Gomez v. 11. State Bd. of Educ., 117 F.R.D. 394, 400 (N.D. 111. 1987); see also
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940).
112. See McGhee v. Bank of Am., 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 450 (Ct. App. 1976). These concerns
mirror the same issues raised in federal practice under Rule 23. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note
19, 23.25 (outlining a wide variety of issues that can affect the representative's adequacy).
113. See Capitol People First v. State Dep't of Developmental Servs., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300,
317 (Ct. App. 2007).
114. J.P. Morgan & Co. v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 227 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 910 (9th Cir. 1975)).
115. 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 317 (Ct. App. 2007).
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be unnecessarily institutionalized.'16 The trial court held that, among
other deficiencies, the plaintiffs could not adequately represent the
class because of the unique needs of developmentally disabled
individuals, finding that what would be best for one plaintiff may not
be optimal for another." 7 According to the trial court, conflicts of
interest therefore prevented adequate representation of some
members of the class who would be best served by institutional
treatment. "8
The California Court of Appeal disagreed." 9 As to whether the
plaintiffs' interests were antagonistic to other class members, the
court pointed out that "[b]efore the outcome of improved
individualized assessment . . . can be realized, the policies that
undergird decisionmaking and allocation of resources must be
changed. As we explain, the class action mechanism is the only
alternative that can achieve this end."' 20 Moreover, the court
emphasized that the existing avenues for appealing the allocation of
state benefits could not provide the type of class-wide relief sought
by the plaintiffs. 2 ' Therefore, the class representatives could
adequately represent the interests of the class because any supposed
claims and because of the
conflicts did not go to the core of the
22
unique need for class action treatment.
In J.P. Morgan & Co. v. Superior Court, 23 conflicts led the
court to the opposite conclusion. The class representative was a
large-scale copper purchaser who brought a class action on behalf of
itself and other purchasers, claiming that the defendants illegally
manipulated the price of copper. 24 Because of the nature of the
copper industry, one class member could be acting as a buyer of
copper and then, in a subsequent transaction, act as a seller of the

116. Id. at 305 (seeking injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to the state's developmental
disabilities law).
117. Id. at 318.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 321.
120. Id.
121. Id. The court also noted that class action treatment was appropriate given the efficiency
both to the litigants as well as the courts. Id.
122. See id. at 317.
123. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214 (Ct. App. 2003).
124. Id. at217.
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same set of goods to another class member.'25 Therefore, the court
recognized that members had conflicts of interests because the class
representative and other class members were frequently on opposite
sides of the same transaction.'26 For any given transaction, one class
member may wish to assert that the price of the goods sold was
inflated, while another may wish to assert that the price of the goods
was proper. 2 7 Due to the extensive conflicts that went to the core of
the subject matter of the litigation, the court thus reversed the trial
court's class certification.'28
ii. The class counsel must adequately
represent the class
In a class action context, where the plaintiffs counsel is
essentially establishing an attorney-client relationship with absent
class members unknown to the counsel, the counsel has a fiduciary
duty to protect those absent members and ensure their interest will be
competently pursued.2 9 Courts therefore require that the class
counsel "must be qualified, experienced and generally able to
conduct the proposed litigation."' 30
As mentioned above, California courts are not alone in requiring
the class action plaintiff to demonstrate that she will adequately
represent the class. 3' Both Rule 23 and section 382 seek to protect
the rights of the absent class members so that the goals of the class
action litigation can be efficiently and competently achieved.

125. See id. at 221 (describing a complex distribution channel that involved at least eight
different tiers).
126. Id. at 227-28.
127. See id. This conflict existed not just between the class representative and the putative
class members but also among the putative class members themselves. Id.
128. See id. at 228 (holding that the failure of the community of interest requirement,
specifically the conflicts of interest justify reversing the trial court's certification of the class).
129. See Cal Pak Delivery v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 213-14 (Ct.
App. 1997).
130. Miller v. Woods, 196 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (Ct. App. 1983).
13 1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (permitting class certification only where "the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class").

Spring 2008]

UNCOMMON COMMON LA W

3. The Class Action Mechanism Must Provide a Substantial Benefit
to Both the Court and the Litigants
While California courts have furthered the state's policy of
encouraging the use of class action litigation,'32 courts employ a
safeguard against abuse by requiring that the class action yield
"substantial benefits" for the court and the parties. 33 In federal
courts, substantial benefits are also required by the language of Rule
23(b)(3):' 34 namely, that the "class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy. "135
California courts generally employ a multi-factor, factuallyspecific analysis to determine if the class action would yield
substantial benefits. For example, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior
Court,'36 the trial court certified a class that consisted of persons who
sought to recover excess tax reimbursements that they paid to the
defendant trading stamp company while redeeming stamps for
The California Supreme Court subsequenetly
merchandise. 37
rejected class certification because it found that the benefit to the
class members would be minimal compared to the expense involved
The decision
in litigating the claim and distributing any award.'
was based on a number of factors including: the small size of the
potential recovery to class members (some with claims as small as
eighteen cents, making it unlikely that such members would ever
bother to come forward to prove their claim), the fact that the
defendant had already changed its allegedly wrongful practice before
the class action was filed, the fact that the defendant had turned the
money at issue over to the public treasury, and the court's
132. See, e.g., Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 96 P.3d 194, 209 (Cal. 2004).
133. See Kaye v. Mount La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n, 252 Cal. Rptr. 67, 79 (Ct. App. 1988)
("Class certification is a procedural device designed to save time and minimize costs. California
courts have liberally interpreted the procedural prerequisites for class certification creating,and
fostering an environment conducive to the extensive use of class actions in a variety of contexts
to simplify complex litigation.").
134. See infra Part II.C. (discussing the types of class actions authorized by Rule 23 including
a "(b)(3)" damages class action).
135. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(b)(3); see also Fireside Bank v. Super. Ct., 155 P.3d 268, 282 (Cal.
2007) (applying section 382 in holding that a requirement of class certification is proof that
"proceeding as a class is superior to other methods").
136. 556 P.2d 755 (Cal. 1976).
137. Id. at 757-58.
138. Id. at 758.
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recognition that fashioning an economically viable remedy was
courts have denied class certification
unlikely.'39 Other California
14
1
factors.
similar
on
based
C. Types of Classes Available
Class actions by their very nature are designed to bind absent
class members. The certification requirements discussed above
provide procedural safeguards and answer the question of who is to
be bound. In addition, courts must address two important questions
that also go to the absent members' due process rights: (1) whether
the putative class members have the option to opt-out in order not to
be bound by the litigation; and (2) whether the absent members must
receive notice of the litigation. 14' The answers to these two questions
will depend on the type of class action brought by a plaintiff/class
representative.
1. Class Types Under Rule 23-the Federal Court Approach
Rule 23(b) establishes three permissible types of class actions.
Once the federal court is satisfied that all of the requirements of Rule
23(a) have been satisfied, the court will then determine whether the
class can proceed under one of the three class types established by
142
Rule 23(b).
a. The Rule 23(b)(1) class
First, a Rule 23(b)(1) class exists when class treatment is
required to avoid prejudice that would result if individual actions
were allowed. 43 More specifically, a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class is
139. Id. at 757-59 (holding that leaving the money in the hands of the public treasury was the
most equitable solution).
140. See Newell v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that a class consisting of policy holders of earthquake insurance was not certifiable
where individual issues predominated and where class adjudication could not provide substantial
benefits to the court or litigants); Basurco v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367 (Ct.
App. 2003) (finding that class treatment was not the superior method of adjudicating insureds'
litigation involving earthquake damage claims, especially where there was a predominance of
individual issues and where adequate alternatives were available).
141. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).
142. The class type dictates not only whether or not the member is entitled to mandatory
notice and/or the availability to opt-out of the class, but also dictates the type of damages that can
be sought by the class.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) ("A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and
if... prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of:
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appropriate in situations where, absent class treatment, the defendant
would be subject to multiple rulings that might establish conflicting
standards of conduct for the defendant.'44 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is
appropriate where the class members might be harmed if they were
forced to separately adjudicate their claims against the opposing
party)45 Under both 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(1)(B), courts have
certified classes in matters of labor, government, trustees of financial
accounts, and in other situations where the defendant acts in a way
that uniformly affects all members.146
For example, in Coleman v. Wilson,'47 the court granted
certification for a 23(b)(1)(B) class where mentally ill state prisoners
alleged that the government provided inadequate mental health
care.'48 On the other hand, in Contract Buyers League v. F & F
Investment,"' a group of African-American purchasers of land sought
The
to certify a 23(b)(1) class against the defendants for fraud.'
court held that the 23(b)(1) class was not appropriate because there
was no threat of inconsistent adjudication where variations could be
attributed to the specific facts of each transaction, rather than a
uniform common practice of the defendant.''

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications
with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.").
144. Id. For example, a landowner may be subject to multiple lawsuits that all seek
abatement of a nuisance on the owner's land. In this situation, the landowner could be subject to
numerous judgments that establish conflicting standards of conduct for the landowner. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's notes (1966 Amendments).
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). This class type is commonly invoked in situations
where the class members are seeking money damages from a "limited fund." A limited fund
involves a situation where "recovery will come from a fixed pool of assets that is or may be
insufficient to satisfy all of the claims against the fund." 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 19, 23.84.
If the class members were forced to separately adjudicate their claims, litigants who obtained
judgment quickly may collect all of the sought-for relief, whereas other litigants who were slower
to the courthouse finish line may find the available pool of funds had been depleted by the other
litigants. Note that, except in limited fund situations, a (b)(1)(B) class is not appropriate for a
class primarily seeking money damages. See id.
146. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 19, 23.42.
147. 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
148. Id. at 1293.
1969).
149. 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. I11.
150. Id.at 14.
151. Id.
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Under a 23(b)(1) class, the plaintiff is generally not required to
provide individual notice to the entire class. 152 The lack of notice
may raise certain due process considerations, but the drafters of the
2003 amendments to Rule 23 were concerned that the cost of notice
could cripple class actions. 5 3 Therefore, Rule 23 vests courts with
the discretion to balance the anticipated benefits of notice versus the
costs of notice in order not to unduly deter the plaintiff from
pursuing class-wide relief. "
Rule 23 does not allow a class member of a (b)(1) class to optout in order to pursue the litigation separately. Allowing a member
of a 23(b)(1) class to opt-out could lead to the very problems the
class type was designed to avoid: "inconsistent adjudications or
adjudications that would impair other class members' individual
interests."' 55 Nevertheless, federal courts demand that 23 (b)(1) and
(b)(2) class members be provided with notice in certain
circumstances, especially where the class seeks monetary damages in
addition to injunctive relief.'56
b. The Rule 23(b)(2) class
The second class type, a 23(b)(2) class, exists where the class
representatives are seeking injunctive or declaratory relief because
the defendant has acted (or failed to act) "on grounds generally
applicable to the class."' 57 A 23(b)(2) class is often invoked by class
action litigants alleging civil rights violations. For example, in
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) ("[T]he court may direct appropriate notice to the class.").
Under Rule 23, the plaintiff generally pays for class notice. See Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (U.S. 1974) ("Where . . . the relationship between the parties is truly
adversary, the plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing
his own suit.").
153. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's notes (2003 Amendments); 5 MOORE ET
AL., supra note 19, 23.100.
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes (2003 Amendments).
155. 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 19, 23.100.
156. See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that because the
appellant was denied an opportunity to opt out of the (b)(1) and (b)(2) class action which sought
both injunctive relief and monetary damages, the appellant should not be precluded from
separately pursuing his claim against the defendant for monetary damages even though the
injunctive relief award was binding upon the appellant); In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1270 (11 th
Cir. 1988) (holding that because petitioners did not have a ight to opt out of the (b)(1) class, the
trial "court's failure to notify petitioners of the certification hearing violated due process").
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). "[T]he party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Id.
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Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 5 ' a class of 1.5 million female employees
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, lost pay, and punitive
damages as a result of Wal-Mart's alleged violations of Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.159 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's certification, finding that Wal-Mart both acted (by paying
women less than men) and failed to act (by failing to promote
equally qualified women) in a manner that was generally applicable
16
to the class. 1
In federal courts, the availability of money damages for a
23(b)(2) class is limited. Some circuits will not certify a 23(b)(2)
class where monetary damages are more than incidental to the
plaintiffs' claim or where such damages require an individual
For example, in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
determination.' 6 '
Corp.,162 the plaintiff sought injunctive relief and monetary damages
(including compensatory, punitive, and other equitable monetary
damages such as back pay) for the defendant's allegedly racially
discriminatory employment practices. 163 The Fifth Circuit explained
that monetary relief predominates when the relief "being sought is
less of a group remedy and instead depends more on the varying
' 64
circumstances and merits of each potential class member's case.'
Because an awarding of monetary damages to the plaintiffs would
require an analysis of "subjective and intangible differences of each
class member's individual circumstances," the court upheld the
denial of 23(b)(2) class certification.'65
On the other hand, in Molski v. Gleich,166 the Ninth Circuit
refused to adopt the bright-line distinction made in Allison between
incidental and non-incidental damages because to do so would
"nullify the discretion vested in the district courts by Rule 23. ' ' 167 In
158. 509 F.3d 1168(9th Cir. 2007).
159. Id. at 1174.
160. Id. A class need only show that the defendant acted or refused to act in a way that was
generally applicable to the class. Id. at 1186 n.13 (citing Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc.,
253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001)).
161. See Allison v. Citgo Petrol Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1998).
162. Id.
163. Id. at416.
164. Id. at413.
165. Id. at 418. The court went on to explain that a (b)(3) class was not available because
individual issues predominated. Id. at 419.
166. 381. F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003).
167. Id. at 950.
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order to determine whether or not monetary damages were the
"essential goal" of the litigation,16 1 the court instead looked at the
specific facts of the case at hand in order to assess the "intent of the
plaintiffs in bringing the suit.

169

In Molski, the named plaintiff filed a class action on behalf of
himself and other disabled individuals against the defendant
petroleum company for an alleged denial of proper access to
California gas stations (considered public accommodations) and for
violations of state and federal anti-discrimination laws. 17' The court
concluded that because the defendant acted in a way that applied
generally to the class and because issues of individual injury claims
were preserved, certification as a 23(b)(2) class was appropriate.' 7'
As with a 23(b)(1) class, class members in a 23(b)(2) class do
not have the right to opt-out of the class, and notice is at the
discretion of the court. 72 However, courts have construed the Rule
23 requirements as sufficiently "flexible to afford district courts
discretion to grant opt-out rights in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. 173
c. The (b)(3) class
The third class type, a 23(b)(3) class, exists where the class
action is superior to other available methods for adjudication and
common questions predominate. 174 A class seeking money damages

168. Id. (citing Linney v. Cellular Alaska P'ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 1998)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at941.
171. Id. at 950. Even though the case settled after certification, and the settlement decree
included damages, the court still found (b)(2) classification proper because the actual damages
did not "flow directly from liability to the class as a whole." Id. at 949-50.
172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), (c)(2)(A).
173. Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94-96 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that while
some courts have allowed opt out rights in a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class, the plaintiffs in the
employment discrimination case at hand failed to demonstrate that "basic fairness" demanded
they be allowed a right to opt out); see also Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144,
1160-61 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to allow
plaintiffs to opt out of a 23(b)(2) class in which class plaintiffs sought monetary damages,
injunctive and declaratory relief).
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The rule establishes the following four factors for the court to
evaluate when considering certification of a (b)(3) class: "(A) the class members' interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature
of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action." Id.
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is a typical example of a 23(b)(3) class," 5 where the class
representatives are "seeking to remedy a common legal grievance."' 76
For example, in Contract Buyers League discussed earlier, the
court turned to whether the defendant's "broad pattern of similar
activity" was sufficient to justify a finding that common questions of
law or fact predominated under 23(b)(3) after determining that a
(b)(1).class was not appropriate.'77 Even though the claims of each
class member were based upon individual contracts with the
defendant, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant defrauded the
class members through a common exploitative scheme.'78 The court
found that these common questions of fact, as well as the common
questions of law surrounding the allegations, predominated.'79
Furthermore, the court ruled that class adjudication was superior to
individual claims as it would avoid a multiplicity of actions and
avoid delay in securing relief for the aggrieved parties. 8 ° Therefore,
the court ruled that the class representatives satisfied the Rule
23(b)(3) requirements.' 8 '
Upon certification of a 23(b)(3) class, the court must direct
notice to all class members, using the best notice that is practicable
in the circumstances, and must give class members an opportunity to
exclude themselves from membership in the class and/or to make an
appearance in the matter within a specified timeframe.'82
2. California's Approach to Class Types
California's section 382 does not designate specific class action
types, nor does it speak to whether a potential class member has a
right to opt-out or receive notice. In California, however, "it is well
established that in the absence of relevant state precedents, trial
courts are urged to follow the procedures prescribed in [R]ule 23...
for conducting class actions." ' 83
175. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 19, 23.44.
176. Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 218 (D. Md. 1971).
177. 48 F.R.D. 7, 11 (D. I1. 1969).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
Obledo,

Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Frazier v. City of Richmond, 228 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Green v.
624 P.2d 256, 267 (Cal. 1981)).
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California courts have thus adopted the federal approach
outlined in Rule 23(b). 84 When California courts face a situation
where a class could fit within either (b)(2) or (b)(3), the "trial court
must be vested with considerable discretion in determining under
which subdivision the action will proceed."' 85 When the nature of
relief proposed by the plaintiff or the characteristics of the parties
make it possible to certify under 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), courts
tend to favor classifying the class under 23(b)(1) or (b)(2).' 86 This
tendency, shared by the federal courts,'87 reflects a general preference
for uniform adjudication provided by a mandatory class, at least
where the plaintiff is primarily seeking injunctive or other nonmonetary relief. 88 Mandatory classes also avoid the costs associated
with the mandatory notice and opt-out procedures involved with a
23(b)(3) class.'89
Similar to the federal approach, 9 ° the certification of a 23(b)(2)
class in California does not prevent the court from granting monetary
relief. 9' For example, in Frazier v. City of Richmond,9 2 a class of
police officers and firefighters sought a declaratory judgment that
their salaries, for the purposes of calculating their retirement
benefits, included the City's payments for insurance and health care
contributions."' In determining whether the plaintiffs' action was a
23(b)(2) or (b)(3) class, the court concluded that "where the

184. Id. See CAL. R. CT. 3.766 for California's specific notice provisions for class actions,
including the possibility that a court may require the defendant to pay for class notice.
185. Frazier,228 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
186. Id. at 382 (citing 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1775, p. 31 (1972)); see also Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F.
Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). After the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the preference for the
mandatory class type was first articulated in Van Gemert in which the defendant sought to
consolidate a number of plaintiffs' securities claims consolidated as a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class action.
Id. at 126-27. The court held that "where the stricter requirements of 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are
squarely presented by the plaintiffs' claims Rule 23(b)(3) is not applicable." Id. at 130.
187. See ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.20
(2007).
188. See Bell v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 277 Cal. Rptr. 583, 594 (Ct. App. 1991).
189. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 187, § 4.20.
190. 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 19,
23.43 (noting that certification under 23(b)(2) is
improper if monetary damages are the primary relief sought but proper where monetary relief is
limited and incidental to injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief).
191. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 187, § 4.14.
192. 228 Cal. Rptr. 376, 377-78 (Ct. App. 1986).
193. Id. at 377-78.
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monetary relief sought is integrally related to and would directly
flow from the injunctive or declaratory relief sought, 23(b)(2) status
is appropriate."' 94 As such, the court supported its determination on
the basis that any monetary relief would directly flow from a
declaratory ruling in the plaintiffs favor.
D. An Overview of Class Certification Through the
Lens of Mr. Miller's Class
The Miller case, discussed earlier in this Article, provided an
example of how one injured plaintiff could summon the procedural
power of a class action to represent, in his case, millions of others.'95
Mr. Miller's individual damages were insufficient to justify bringing
his claim individually against the bank, but the class action against
Bank of America could lead to a class award exceeding one billion
dollars.'96 Of course, the class must be certified before any class
award may be granted. 97
1. The California Class Action
Plaintiff Paul Miller sought to certify a class which was defined
as:
All California residents who have, have had or will have, at
any time after August 13, 1994, a checking or savings
deposit account with Bank of America into which payments
of Social Security benefits or other public benefits are or
have been directly deposited by the govermment or its
agent.'98

194. Id. at 382.
195. Miller v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., No. CGC-99-301917, 2004 WL 3153009, at *1
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2004).
196. Harriet Chiang, Jury Awards BofA Customers $1 Billion, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26, 2004,
A22.
197. California courts usually require a hearing in order to determine whether or not to certify
the class. See Carabini v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 523 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Due process
requires an order with such significant impact on the viability of a case not be made without a full
opportunity to brief the issues and present evidence."). However, a certification hearing would
not be necessary where "all issues are resolved by stipulation of the named parties and approved
by the court." CAL. R. CT. 3.764(e).
198. Order Certifying the Class at 1, Miller v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., No. 301917 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2001). The order was entered subsequent to a certification hearing held four
months prior to the entry of the order. Id.
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With the class so defined, the court proceeded to examine
whether it was an ascertainable class. Because the members shared
objectively identifiable characteristics-California residents with
Bank of America accounts during the period at issue who received
their government benefits via direct deposit into their account-and
because the class was sufficiently numerous to make joinder
impracticable, the court held that the class was ascertainable.' 99
The court then examined whether the plaintiff had demonstrated
a sufficient community of interest. The plaintiffs complaint alleged
that the defendant's business practice "applied to all members of the
class."2 ' Bank of America allegedly had an established business
practice of seizing funds from accounts that contained directly
deposited government benefits to cover overdraft fees and other
account charges, 1 ' and the questions concerning this common
practice were sufficient to convince the court that "[c]ommon issues
of law and fact predominate[d] over individual issues to be litigated
in this case.""2 2 Therefore, the court found that there was a sufficient
community of interest to justify class certification.0 3
Finally, the court declared that litigating the claims of roughly
one million class members as a class action was "superior to
alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication.

.204

With

that, the court granted the motion to certify the class.20 5

199. Id.
200. Id. Given this similar treatment, there was no dispute that Mi. Miller's claims were
typical of the class.
201. See Miller v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., No. CGC-99-301917, 2004 WL 3153009, at *7
(Cal. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 30, 2004).
202. Order Certifying the Class, supra note 198, at 1-2.
203. Id.Note that the court made no mention of the adequacy of the class representative or
his counsel. However, the lead counsel for the plaintiffs, James C. Sturdevant and Thomas J.
See Thomas J Brandi Profile,
Brandi, were both experienced class action attorneys.
http://www.brandilaw.com/bio/ThomasBrandi.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); James C.
Sturdevant Profile, http://www.sturdevantlaw.comi/Staff.php?Staff-3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
204. Order Certifying the Class, supra note 198, at 2.
205. Id.
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2. A Hypothetical Federal Class Certification 216

Using the facts of Miller, the federal certification procedures
outlined by Rule 23 could have yielded the same result. The millionplus class members would clearly satisfy the numerosity requirement
of Rule 23(a)(1). 2 7

As the California Superior court found, the

plaintiffs claim that the bank's practice affected all class members
uniformly would likely raise a common question of law and thereby
satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)'s demand that the plaintiff show the claims
involve common questions of law or fact." 8 Mr. Miller's claims did
not appear to be in any way atypical of other purported class
members, and so the requirement of typicality under Rule 23(a)(3)
would be met. 2°9 Finally, Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement of adequacy of

representation would likely be satisfied because of the experience of
plaintiffs' lead counsel and because Mr. Miller's interests were
aligned with the other class members. 1 °
If the federal court held that the plaintiff met the four threshold
requirements of Rule 23(a), a federal court would then turn to Rule

23(b) to determine whether any of the three class types were
appropriate. Although the Miller complaint sought injunctive relief
in order to stop the alleged violations,2 1 the dominant purpose of the

claim was to obtain monetary damages, therefore making a 23(b)(3)
class appropriate.2

Under a 23(b)(3) class, Mr. Miller would have to establish that
common questions of law or fact predominate over questions

affecting individual class members. 213 Because the fundamental issue
206. In federal courts, hearings to determine class certification are not required but are
routine. See Marcera v. Chinlund, 565 F.2d 253, 255 (2nd Cir. 1977) (holding that because the
plaintiffs were denied a hearing that would have provided them a "full opportunity to establish
that the requisites of class certification exist[ed]," the motion denying class certification was
reversed and remanded for hearing); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.21.
207. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement and its
relation to California's "community of interest" requirement under section 382).
208. See supra Part II.B.2.
209. See supra Part II.B.2.
210. See supra Part II.B.2.
211. See Miller v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., No. CGC-99-301917, 2004 WL 3153009, at *33
(Cal. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 30, 2004).
212. The actual court order in Miller did not address any of the Rule 23(b) class types. See
Order Certifying the Class, supra note 198, at 1.
213. See supra Part II.C. (discussing the three types of classes permitted pursuant to Rule
23(b)).
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applicable to all class members would be whether the defendant's
actions amounted to an illegal seizure of government benefits under
California law, a federal court could find the predominance
requirement to be satisfied. Finally, given that a class action would
efficiently and effectively resolve the claims on behalf of all class
members, the class action would likely be found to be the superior
method of adjudication compared to other alternatives. Therefore, a
federal court could reasonably find that the requirements of Rule
23(b) were met and the action could be certified.
The Miller case and the hypothetical federal counterpart
illustrate that, at least as far as the certification requirements of
section 382 and Rule 23, the differences between the two are not
terribly remarkable. Given the extent to which California has
borrowed from the statutorily based Rule 23, this is hardly a surprise.
Because Rule 23(a) demands that litigants satisfy the four
prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation, the federal approach may give "at least the
appearance of a tighter framework of analysis. 214 In the end, any
variance between state and federal certification may have more to do
with the specific judge granting or denying certification than the
certification procedures themselves.215 However, there are a few
other distinctions between California and federal practice that are
more clearly divergent, to which this Article now turns.
III. NOTABLE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CALIFORNIA AND
FEDERAL PROCEDURE

A comprehensive comparison of every detail of California and
federal class action practice is beyond the scope of this Article.1 6
However, this section will highlight two important issues in
California and federal class action practice: whether a trial court's
decision regarding class certification can be immediately appealed
and whether filing a class action tolls the statute of limitations for the
members of the purported class.

214. TIMOTHY D. COHELAN, COHELAN ON CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTIONS § 2:8 (2007).
215. See infra PartV.
216. For a more detailed treatment, see COHELAN, supra note 214 and CABRASER ET AL.,
supra note 31.
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A. Appellate Review of Class Certification
Class certification is "often the whole ball game." '17 As Judge
Easterbrook of the Sevenh Circuit explained:
[J]ust as a denial of class status can doom the plaintiff, so a
grant of class status can put considerable pressure on the
defendant to settle, even when the plaintiffs probability of
success on the merits is slight. Many corporate executives
are unwilling to bet their company that they are in the right
in big-stakes litigation, and a grant of class status can
propel the stakes of a case into the stratosphere.218
Therefore, a litigant must be aware of what avenues the
jurisdiction makes available to seek review of an unfavorable class
certification ruling.
1. California's Approach
CCP section 904 establishes that, generally, only final
judgments are appealable.2" 9 A denial of class certification is not
technically a final order because the named plaintiff can still
theoretically maintain the action against the defendant on an
individual basis. 2 Therefore, using a strict textual analysis, an order
denying class certification should not be appealable under California
law. However, if the court's order essentially terminates the action
as to the class (known as a "death-knell" order), the order is
considered "final" as to that class, and the plaintiff has a right to
directly appeal the order.22 '
For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court,22 the
trial court ruled that the plaintiffs class action could continue only
against one of the two defendants and only for one of the two causes
of action.223 The California Court of Appeal, relying on the

217. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Beaver, 466 F.3d 1289, 1294 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
218. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999).
219. See CAL. C1V. PROC. CODE §§ 904.1-.2 (Deering 2007). A writ of mandate may also be
available if the party is without "a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of
law." Id. § 1086.
220. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 736 (Cal. 1967)).
221. Stephen v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1991).
222. 244 Cal. Rptr. 776 (Ct. App. 1988).
223. Id. at 777.
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22 4
California Supreme Court's holding in Vasquez v. Superior Court,
ruled that such an order was not appealable because it did not
effectively dismiss the action as to all members of the class."' The
General Motors court reasoned that granting a right to appeal on
"each detail of a class certification order would delay trials and vex
' Where the order does act as a
litigants with multiple proceedings.""26
death knell, however, "a plaintiff who fails to appeal from one loses
'
forever the right to attack it."227

In contrast, a California class action defendant does not have a
right to appeal an order granting class certification. 28 A defendant
can only appeal an order granting class certification after there has
been a final judgment.229 Alternatively, a defendant may petition the
court of appeal for a writ of mandate. The court has discretion to
grant the writ, which may be appropriate in order "to prevent a
failure of justice where there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."23 In addition, the court of appeal may grant the writ
where it finds that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
certification.231
2. The Federal Approach
Federal Rule 23(f) provides for discretionary interlocutory
appeal-an appeal prior to the conclusion of the trial-of a district
court's ruling on class certification.232 . Unlike California's approach,
a party in federal court may seek an interlocutory appeal from either
the grant or denial of class certification, so long as the petition for

224. 484 P.2d 964, 967-81 (Cal. 1971) (holding that an order dismissing one of two causes of
action in a class action was not appealable).
225. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Super. Ct., 244 Cal. Rptr. 776, 778 (Ct. App. 1988). The court
also noted that the granting of class certification is not a "death-knell" order and therefore not
directly appealable. Id.
226. Id. at 779.
227. Stephen v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1991).
228. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(a) (Deering 2007); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2004).
229. Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755, 759 n.4 (Cal. 1976).
230. Alys Masek, 43 Cal. Jur. 3d. Mandamus and Prohibitions § 2 (2007) (discussing the writ
of mandate proceedings authorized in California by CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1084-85 (Deering
2007)).
231. See Blue Chip Stamps, 556 P.2d at 759.
232. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
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appeal is filed within ten days of the district court's order. 33 As the
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23 indicate, "[t]he court of
appeals is given unfettered discretion whether to permit the appeal,"
much like the discretion of the Supreme Court to decide whether to
grant a petition for certiorari. 34
Despite this open-ended discretion, the Rule 23 Advisory
Committee Notes suggest that review of a court's class certification
order is justified in only three scenarios: (1) where the order amounts
to a "death knell" for the plaintiff (i.e., the plaintiff representative is
denied class certification and can no longer shoulder the burden of
the litigation alone); (2) where the order amounts to the "death knell"
for the defendant (i.e., the grant of class certification essentially
forces the defendant "to settle rather than incur the costs of
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous
liability"); and (3) where the class action involves a fundamental
issue of law that is unsettled.235
The Ninth Circuit has adopted these Advisory Committee
guidelines in determining when review of class certification
decisions is appropriate. 36 Moreover, like other circuit courts,23 7 the
Ninth Circuit has added an additional basis for review: where "the
district court's decision is manifestly erroneous. '"235
For instance, in Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co.,239 Ford argued
that the district court's order, certifying a class of over one hundred
thousand members who collectively sought close to one hundred
million dollars, amounted to a death knell for the litigation, forcing
the company into the prospect of an "all or nothing" trial.2 4" The
Ninth Circuit, however, was not convinced "'that the damages
claimed would force a company of [Ford's] size to settle without
233. Id.
234. Id. advisory committee's notes (1998 Amendments).
235. Id.
236. Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005).
237. See In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
see also Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir.
2001); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 2001).
238. Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959. The court clarified that unlike some other circuits, a party
need only show that the error is manifest, "even absent a showing of another factor." Id. The
error most likely to invoke review is an error of law as opposed to an erroneous application of law
to the facts of the case. See id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 960.

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol.41:783

relation to the merits of the class's claims.""'24 The court held that
Ford failed to demonstrate that it lacked the resources to defend the
matter or that doing so would prove "ruinous" to Ford.142 In addition,
the court found that Ford failed to show that the district court's ruling
as to class certification was questionable.2 43

The Ninth Circuit

essentially held that even if Ford were to establish that class
certification would terminate the litigation, any appeal of the
certification order would be futile unless the district court was found
to have somehow abused its discretion in certifying the class.244
Ultimately, California courts provide plaintiffs with a right to
appeal a class certification order that acts as a death knell to the class
action, but the same right to appeal is not available in federal courts.
However, federal courts utilize much more flexible criteria than
California courts in determining whether or not an appeal is proper.
The federal approach also provides an avenue of appeal for both
parties, whereas only the party asserting the class has the right to
appeal after a denial of class certification in California.
These differences are more than just procedural technicalities.
In California courts, if a judge seeks to resolve issues in a way to
avoid being reversed on appeal, the propensity might be to certify the
class rather than face what would certainly be appeal of a death knell
order. 45 If it later turns out that class certification is not supported,
the judge can subsequently decertify the class. 46
Regardless, California courts, by providing a right to a class
action plaintiff for a death knell order, give plaintiffs a significant
strategic advantage over defendants who have no right to appeal the
241. Id. (quoting In re Lorazepam, 289 F.3d at 108).
242. Id. (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (f) advisory committee's note (1998 Amendments)).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 960-61 (citing Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The Chamberlan court also suggested that the established criteria reflect the two prong purpose of
Rule 23(f). First, the rule can "restore equilibrium when a doubtful class certification ruling
would virtually compel a party to abandon a potentially meritorious claim or defense before trial."
Id. at 957-58 (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir.
2000)). Second, where the "need is sufficiently acute," the rule can empower a court of appeals
to take an "earlier-than-usual cognizance of important, unsettled legal questions, thus contributing
to both the orderly progress of complex litigation and the orderly development of law." Id.
(quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, 208 F.3d at 293).
245. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in
Complex Litigation,59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 422 (2007).
246. See Telephone Interview with William L. Stem, Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jan.
16, 2008).
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grant of certification. More than just a policy favoring class actions,
this advantage shifts the balance of power in favor of the plaintiff.
Perhaps the court in General Motors should have been more
forthcoming and stated that the death knell doctrine is intended to
avoid delaying trials and vexing plaintiffs with multiple
proceedings.247
Given the extensive impact that a class certification order can
have on the settlement dynamics between parties, California courts
may be well served by providing the defendant with an opportunity
to appeal an order certifying the class, just as plaintiffs are now
afforded an opportunity to appeal a denial of certification that acts as
a "death knell" to class adjudication. However, assuming that a
certification that exceeds a trial court's discretion is the exception
rather than the rule, the availability of a writ of mandate may be
sufficient to protect the defendant. 248 A defendant's right to appeal a
certification order could be exploited as a tool to delay the case and
increase the expense to the opposing party. In all, the Rule 23
approach likely affords the most neutrality by allowing a court of
appeals ample discretion over whether or not to review a certification
order. If California adopted the federal approach of allowing
appellate courts discretion over whether or not to grant a petition by
either party for review of a certification order, state courts could still
employ public policy to favor class adjudication but would do so
without structurally affecting the practical outcome of the underlying
litigation (i.e., whether or not a case settles). Even the most fervent
advocate of litigation reform would have a difficult time claiming
that a state court of appeal was a "judicial hellhole. 249
247. Contra Gen. Motors Corp. v. Super Ct., 244 Cal. Rptr. 776, 779 (Ct. App. 1988) (noting
that granting a right to appeal on "each detail of a class certification order would delay trials and
vex litigants with multiple proceedings").
248. See Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Decisions: A
Preliminary Empirical Study of Federal and State Experience, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 26
(noting that California utilizes the writ of mandate more generally than in federal practice).
249. See infra Part V (discussing whether or not California courts can fairly be considered
biased). But cf Freer, supra note 248, at 27 (noting that "the degree to which Rule 23(f) is a
roadblock to federal plaintiff classes varies from circuit to circuit"). Professor Freer found that
the Ninth Circuit is more likely to reverse certification on appeal than other federal circuits. Id.
More specifically, he found that "[tihe state appellate courts have reversed certification only once
in ten cases, while the Ninth Circuit has reversed certification in two of five cases." Id. These
numbers, though admittedly based upon a small sample size, suggest that "whenever courts are
given absolute discretion-as they are under Rule 23(f)--they can define their roles, and we
should not be surprised if they define those roles differently." Id. at 28.
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B. Statutes ofLimitation

Statutes of limitation operate on the theory that unless the
plaintiff has "put the adversary on notice to defend within the period
of limitation," the defendant's right to be free from stale claims
prevails over the plaintiffs right to prosecute those claims.25 In the
context of representative actions, the question remains whether the
defendant has been put on notice of claims against him or her from
absent class members and whether the class suit tolls the statute of
limitation for absent class members if the class is not ultimately
certified.
The concern raised by courts is that failing to toll the statute of
limitations for the claims of absent class members could convert a
class action into a trap "for those who have expeditiously allowed
their rights to be maintained by a class action."25 ' In American Pipe
& Construction Co. v. Utah,252 the Supreme Court held that filing a

class action tolled the statute of limitations for all members of the
purported class, even if some members were unaware of the
litigation. 3 The Court believed that to hold otherwise would
"frustrate the principal function of a class suit" because each class
member would be required to file an individual suit or otherwise
intervene in the underlying action in order to insure that their claim
was tolled. 4 The Court found that this problem was "precisely the
multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was designed to avoid.

'255

The

Supreme Court justified this approach, noting that through the filing
of a class action, the defendant is made aware not only of the
substantive claims "brought against them, but also ...

the number

and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate
'
in the judgment."256
This tolling of class members' claims has been
liberally applied in federal courts, even where the class action was
never certifiable in the first place. 7
250. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
251. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 590 (10th Cir. 1961) (citing
York v. Guar. Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944)).
252.
253.
254.
255.

414 U.S. 538 (1974).
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id.

256. Id. at 555.
257. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1983). The tolling of a
statute of limitations may not apply if a party is attempting to "relitigate an earlier denial of class
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Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion in American Pipe
in which he cautioned that the decision should not be an invitation
for lawyers to file pleadings as a class action merely to protect
"members of the purported class who have slept on their rights. 2 58
He commented that some claims should be barred as prejudicial
against a defending party who did not receive proper notice of the
assertions against them. 59
While federal courts are bound by the majority opinion in
American Pipe, the California Supreme Court in Jolly v. Eli Lilly &
Co.26" adopted a narrower reading of American Pipe that was in line
with Justice Blackmun's concerns. The California Supreme Court
outlined two policy issues to consider when determining whether to
toll the statute of limitations for absent class members: (1) to
promote and protect the efficacy of the class action device; and (2) to
protect a defendant from unfair claims.26 '
The plaintiff in Jolly pursued a class action for personal injury
damages against the defendant drug manufacturer, claiming that the
defendant's defective drug harmed the fetuses of pregnant women
who ingested the drug. 262 The plaintiff alleged that a previous class
action filed against the defendant tolled the statute of limitations as
to their otherwise barred claims.263 The court ruled that the plaintiff
could not rely on a previously filed class action in order to toll the
statute of limitations because the prior class action did not seek
personal injury damages and therefore did not put the defendant on
notice of the nature of the damages claim. 2' The court commented
that where a previous putative class action (such as a personal injury
mass tort) fails to "meet the community of interest requirement in
that each member's right to recover depends on facts peculiar to each
certification." Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); see also
Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 876 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the tolling established by
American Pipe does not "permit the filing by putative class members of a subsequent class action
nearly identical in scope to the original class action which was denied certification").
258. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 561 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 561-62.
751 P.2d 923 (Cal. 1988).
Id. at 934-36.
Id. at 925-26.

263. Id. at 933. The previous action could not be certified because of the lack of common
questions of law or fact, a common problem in mass tort claims. Id. at 934.
264. Id. at 936.
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particular case, such claims may be presumptively incapable of
apprising defendants of 'the substantive claims being brought against
them." 2 65 The court warned that a lack of commonality will not only
defeat certification but would also make the American Pipe tolling
doctrine inapplicable. 6 6 Therefore, after considering the policy of
protecting the efficacy of the class action device and the defendant,
the court held that the American Pipe doctrine should not apply to
the plaintiff's claims in Jolly.267
Three years later, the California Court of Appeal heeded Jolly's
warning but did not extend the holding.268 In Becker v. McMillan
Construction Co.,269 plaintiff Becker brought an individual property
damage claim against the defendant builder involving property
damages in a housing development built by the defendant.270 One of
Becker's neighbors had previously filed a class action against the
defendant, but that action was denied certification due to the lack of
common questions of law or fact.2 1' Becker's claim would have been
barred by the statute of limitations, but he argued that his claim was
tolled from the time his neighbor's class action was filed until the
time that it was ultimately denied certification. 2
The Becker court drew a distinction between class actions for
personal injuries-where it can be rather difficult for a defendant to
be on notice as to the number and identities of the potential
claimants, thereby making the tolling doctrine inappropriate-and
class actions for property damages-where a defendant can more
readily ascertain the number of claimants and the extent of claims,
thereby making the tolling doctrine more appropriate. 73 In Becker,
the court found that the earlier class action put the defendant builder
on notice as to the number of claimants (from the number of homes
that the defendant built) as well as the identity of the potential
claimants.274 In addition, while a lack of commonality was enough to
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id.at 937 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974)).
Id.
Id. at 936.
See Becker v. McMillan Constr. Co., 277 Cal. Rptr. 491, 494-95 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id.

273. Id.at 496.
274. Id.
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defeat class certification of the prior action, the court noted that
"[v]ariations in proof of causation and damage are not as extreme for
this type of property damage as for personal injury mass tort
cases." 275 The court found that the defendant was provided with
sufficient notice to justify tolling the statute of limitations while the
class action was being considered.2 76 After reaffirming the holding
and reasoning of Jolly,2 71 the court therefore concluded, as Justice

Blackmun likely would have, that because the defendant in Becker
was on notice as to the same subject matter and the same type of
claim, the statute of limitations was tolled while the class action was
being considered.278
California courts have an express preference for class action
adjudication, but by following Jolly and narrowing the scope of
American Pipe, that preference gives way to the policy consideration
of barring stale claims.279 In practice, a putative class member who
receives notice of a class action may not have the legal sophistication
or the patience to read through the notice and assess whether their
individual claim is sufficiently similar such that it would satisfy the
community of interest standard, as required by Jolly. Therefore,
while California's approach appropriately bars claims by those who
have slept on their rights, the claims of unsophisticated class
members may be inappropriately barred who, in reliance of a class
action notice, merely hit the snooze button one too many times by
assuming their claim is being represented in the class action.

275. Id. at 497.
276. Id. (holding that, consistent with the California Supreme Court's approach in Jolly, the
American Pipe tolling doctrine "can only be determined by individualized attention to the identity
of the claimants and the nature of the claims involved, and by a careful weighing of the important
policy considerations in this area").
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 30 (Cal. 1981) (explaining that
California "has a public policy which encourages the use of the class action device"). On the
other hand, some suggest that Rule 23's policy considerations of "promoting judicial economy
and effectiveness" are met by failing to toll class members personal injury claims. Jerold S.
Solovy et al., Class Action Controversies, in PRAC. LAW INST., CURRENT PROBLEMS INFEDERAL
CIVIL PRACTICE 499, 551 (1994) (suggesting that Rule 23 considerations are met by failing to
toll class members personal injury claims in Jolly because those members should not have relied
on the prior class action which did not seek personal injuries).
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IV. CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY ALTERNATIVE FOR
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS

For quite some time, California has "enjoy[ed] a high reputation
for both the quantity and the quality of its consumer protection
law."28 A full treatment of the statutory protections afforded to
California consumers is well beyond the scope of this Article.2 8'
However, this section explores the relevant provisions of the CLRA
and the UCL as they relate to the California class action litigation
climate.
A. The CLRA

In addition to section 382, California plaintiffs have an
additional statutory mechanism to bring a consumer class action: the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act.28 2 The passage of the CLRA was
prompted, at least indirectly, by the civil unrest of the late 1960s. 83
In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson directed the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders to report on the causes of the unrest
and riots, which caused millions of dollars of damage and led to over
eighty deaths. 284 The commission's report 285 highlighted certain
social and economic problems that resulted from deceptive business
practices .256

Shortly thereafter, in 1970, the California legislature provided its
citizens with a statutory vehicle to "protect consumers against unfair
and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and
280. See WILLIAM L. STERN, BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 ch. 1 (2007)
(commenting that the UCL is "the toughest pro-consumer law in California (and perhaps the
nation)") [hereinafter STERN TREATISE]; Richard Wright, Toward a Consumer Code for
California,5 PAC. L.J. 529, 529 (1974).
281. For a detailed treatment of UCL and CLRA practice, see STERN TREATISE, supra note
280.
282. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-84 (Deering 2007).
283. See James S. Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAC. L.J. 1. 5-7 (1971) ("[U]nfortunately the low income,
unsophisticated person is most often the victim of deceptive sales practices .... The Kerner
Commission found that much of the violence in recent urban disorders was directed at stores and
other commercial establishments in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Rioters seemed to focus on
stores operated by merchants who, they believed, had been charging exorbitant prices or selling
inferior goods.").
284. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
285. See id.
286. Id.; see also Reed, supra note 283, at 5-7.
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'
In line with the
economical procedures to secure such protection."287
act's origins, CLRA claims require that the plaintiff be an
"individual" consumer who pursues a claim for a transaction relating
to "personal, family, or household purposes. 288

1. Asserting a CLRA Class Action Claim
The CLRA provides a non-exclusive remedy for consumers who
have been subjected to any of the twenty-three enumerated "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. '"289
Of the twenty-three, one of the more frequently invoked provisions
of the CLRA is the prohibition against including an unconscionable
provision in a consumer contract.29 More than just an affirmative
defense to the enforceability of a contract, the CLRA "supplies an
affirmative right to relief for consumers who allegedly are injured by
an unconscionable contract provision. 1291
For example, in Truta v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.,292 the
plaintiff brought a class action against the defendant rental car
company for including an allegedly unconscionable collision damage
waiver provision into the rental agreement in violation of the
CLRA.2 93 In holding that the trial court erred in granting the
demurrer to the CLRA claim, the California Court of Appeal noted
that while the state's unconscionability statutes provided authority
287. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (Deering 2007).
288. Id. § 1761(d); see also Cal. Growers Ass'n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 403
(Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff, an association representing retail and wholesale
grocers, was not a consumer as defined by the CLRA and therefore was not entitled to relief
under that statute). A consumer, in the context of the CLRA, is "an individual who seeks or
acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household
purposes." CAL. CIV. CODE § 176 1(d).
289. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1760 (Deering 2007).
290. Julia B. Strickland & Lisa M. Simonetti, 2007 Overview of California's Unfair
Competition Law and Consumers Legal Remedies Act, STROOCK SPECIAL BULL. (Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan LLP, L.A., Cal.), Jan. 2007, at 53-54, http://www.stroock.com1SiteFilesl
Pub488.pdf [hereinafter Stroock 2007 Overview] (mentioning that in addition to the prohibition
of unconscionability, other frequently invoked CLRA provisions include the prohibition of "bait
and switch" rebate offers and the prohibition of misrepresentations regarding the rights or terms
of a written contract). See, e.g., Pollard v. Ericsson, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496, 501 (Ct. App.
2004) (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 1770(a)(17) which prohibits "[r]epresenting that the consumer
will receive a rebate, discount, or other economic benefit, if the earning of the benefit is
contingent on an event to occur subsequent to the consummation of the transaction").
291. See Stroock 2007 Overview, supra note 290, at 54 (citing Truta v. Avis Rent A Car Sys.,
Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 806, 816 (Ct. App. 1987)).
292. 238 Cal. Rptr. 806, 816 (Ct. App. 1987).
293. Truta, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
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for a defense to the enforceability of the unconscionable contract or
clause, 29 4 the legislature (by virtue of the CLRA) "has provided a
damage and injunctive remedy to consumers injured by unfair

business practices arising from a contract provision deemed unlawful
'
by reason of its unconscionable nature."295
The CLRA does not follow section 382 class certification

requirements. Instead, the CLRA requires a California court to
certify a CLRA class action if the representative plaintiff can meet
these four exclusive criteria: (1) it is impracticable to bring all of the

class members before the court; (2) common questions of law or fact
predominate; (3) the representative plaintiffs claims are typical of
the class; and (4) "[t]he representative plaintiffs will fairly and
These class
adequately protect the interests of the class. ' 296
certification criteria are virtually identical to the prerequisites found

in Rule 23(a) and are interpreted accordingly.297
2. Major Differences Between CLRA and Section 382
Class Action Procedures

Class actions brought under the CLRA are subject to the same
procedural rules as other class actions, 298 and while there is certainly

overlap between the CLRA and section 382, they are different in
As the California Supreme Court first
certain key respects.
announced in Hogya v. Superior Court,29 9 CLRA claimants need not

prove that the class action is a superior method of adjudication, as
required under section 382, nor must the claimants show a
294. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (Deering 2007). "If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result." Id.
295. Truta, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
296. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (b)(4) (Deering 2007). The CLRA demands that "the court shall
permit the suit to be maintained on behalf of all members of the represented class if' the class
criteria are met. Id. § 178 1(b).
297. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); supra Part II.B.; see also Reed, supra note 283, at 14
(mentioning the lack of legislative history addressing the class action procedures of the CLRA but
noting that the CLRA should be read in the spirit of the principles of equity and in line with the
California Supreme Court's cognizance of Rule 23). The CLRA was passed three years after the
California Supreme Court's decision in Daar which decided the year after the 1966 amendment
to Rule 23. See Daar v. Yellow Cab, 433 P.2d 732, 742 (Cal. 1967).
298. See CAL. R. CT. 3.760(a).
299. 142 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Ct. App. 1977).
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substantial benefit to the public in order to obtain class
certification.0 °
In Hogya, the plaintiff, on behalf of himself and approximately
350,000 other consumers, brought a CLRA claim against a meat
packer that falsely represented its beef as "choice" quality when it
actually only qualified in the lesser category of "good" quality.3 1
The trial court found that the plaintiff satisfied the four statutory
requirements discussed above.30 2 Nevertheless, the trial court
declined to certify the class for two reasons.3 3 First, the total amount
of actual damages (the difference in price between the "choice" and
"good" categories of beef) was relatively small at $160,000. 3o
Moreover, it was highly unlikely that any single class member's
share would exceed ten dollars, and this made it unlikely that a
member would come forward to assert their right to a portion of the
damages if the suit were successful.3 5 Second, litigating this claim
was expensive for both parties and a burden on the court, and the
trial court found that these burdens outweighed the expected benefits
of certifying this class.30 6
Despite the findings of the trial court that class treatment was
not necessarily the superior method of adjudication and did not
necessarily provide a substantial benefit to the parties and the court,
the California Supreme Court held that if the four CLRA statutory
certification requirements are met, the court must certify the class.30 7
The approach outlined by the court differs from section 382, in that a
trial court may exercise its "sound discretion" whether or not to
certify a class under section 382.308 This can be seen as an
expression of the CLRA's purpose to prevent or control exploitative

300. Id. at 334.

301. Id. at 327.
302. Id. at 332 (referring to the requirements set forth in CAL. CIV. CODE §1781(b) (Deering
2007)).
303. Id. at 331.
304. Id. The CLRA allows for actions to proceed where the total damages is as low as
$1,000. CAL. CIV. CODE §1781(a)(1).
305. Hogya, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
306. Id.
307. Reed, supra note 283, at 5.

308. Hogya, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (citing to Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d
755, 762 (Cal. 1976)). Cf CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(b) (providing that the court shall certify the
class action if the four requirements are shown).
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practices, as well as California's general preference for and
encouragement of class adjudications.0 9
The Miller case provides another quick glimpse at CLRA
certification.
Mr. Miller asserted that Bank of America
misrepresented that it had a right to seize directly deposited
government benefits in order to recover bank fees, and that these
actions were actually a violation of applicable laws. 31" At trial, the
jury found that the bank's conduct was in violation of the CLRA,
which prohibits "representing that a transaction ...involves rights..

. which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by
law. ''31 As discussed previously, the facts of Miller would likely
yield class certification under the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
Rule 23(b), 12 and certification of the Miller claims would certainly
be appropriate under the CLRA given that the four class certification
requirements are the same as Rule 23(a) alone.
3. Other CLRA Procedures
Before leaving the subject of the CLRA, note that to seek
monetary damages, the CLRA requires a plaintiff to first make a
written demand at least thirty days before filing a claim, requesting
that the offending party rectify the stated wrong.3 3 This notice
requirement may help promote negotiation and settlement.3 4 In
addition, it provides the defendant with an opportunity to satisfy
potential claims in a way that reduces the chances of facing a class
action in that particular forum.3 5 Unlike section 382, the CLRA
309. See Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) (protecting a right of a
consumer to class action where "the consumer is being asked to waive the right to class action
litigation or the right to classwide arbitration"); Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 96 P.3d
194, 209 (Cal. 2004) (commenting that California has a public policy which encourages the use
of class actions).
310. Miller v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., No. CGC-99-301917, 2004 WL 3153009, at *14
(Cal. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 30, 2004).
311. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)(14) (Deering 2007) (emphasis added). The trial court also
found that the agreements between the bank and class members were unconscionable in violation
of CAL. CiV. CODE § 1770(a)(19). Miller, 2004 WL 3153009 at *2.
312. See supra Part II.D.2.
313. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1782 (Deering 2007). The notice requirement does not apply to a
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief
314. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an
Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 2010 (2004).
315. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-Certification Communication Ethics in Class Actions,
36 GA. L. REV. 353, 404 (2002). For example, a hypothetical plaintiff provides notice to a
defendant bank of an intent to bring a CLRA claim for the bank's representation that its
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does not necessitate that "a plaintiff show a probability that each
class member will come forward and prove his separate claim to a
portion of the recovery."3" 6 Additionally, the CLRA allows for actual
damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys'
fees3"' 7-unlike the UCL, which only provides for restitution and does
not provide for attorneys' fees.3 8
B. The UCL 's FormerQuasi-ClassAction

California's current Unfair Competition Law3 9 has undergone a
significant evolution.

Dating back to the 1872 enactment of the

state's Civil Code, California legislators provided for a cause of
action for certain business torts, such as commercial disparagement,
trade secret theft, and trade name infringement.3 2' Today, after over
a century of amendments and case law development,3 21 the UCL

protects parties from "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising. 3 22 In line with the statute's purpose of preserving fair
business competition,3 23 the UCL has been applied broadly to protect
against both "'anti-competitive' business practices" as well as to
protect the public from fraud and deceit.3 24 Indeed, "with its broad
liability standards and powerful equitable remedies, the UCL has

been the foremost 'sword' for plaintiffs' lawyers in California.

325

customers would receive a reduction in account fees that the bank did not actually provide. The
bank could immediately send refund checks to members of the class for the promised discount in
order to resolve the underlying dispute and/or circumvent the standing of the plaintiffs to bring
the action.
316. Mass Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 190, 193 n.l (Ct. App. 2002)
(citing Hogya v. Super. Ct 142 Cal. Rptr. 325, 334 (Ct. App. 1977)).
317. CAL. CIV. CODE §1780(a)(1)-(5) (Deering 2007).
318. See STERN TREATISE, supra note 280, at ch. 8-A.
319. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-09 (Deering 2007).
320. See Robert C. Fellmeth, California's Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and
Confusions, 26 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 227, 231 (1995), available at
www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/BKST/BKST-Fellmeth.pdf (discussing the UCL's statutory predecessor,
former Civil Code section 3369).
321. Id. at 232-33.
322. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 2007).
323. See Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 552 n.3 (Cal.
1999).
324. See Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass'n., 496 P.2d 817, 829-30 (Cal. 1972).
325. Stroock 2007 Overview, supra note 290, at 1; see William L. Stem, The Reliance
Element in State Consumer-FraudClass Actions, 23 REV. BANK. & FIN. SERV. 1, 4 (2007)
(noting that the UCL "has long been one of the most pro-consumer in the nation").
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Unlike the CLRA, which details 23 prohibitions, the UCL is
open ended and entrusts the court to determine the applicability of
the prohibition. 326 However, the only kind of monetary damages
available under the UCL is restitution, while the CLRA allows for
much broader remedies.327
Until recently, the UCL provided unique mechanisms to bring
representative actions, including the ability of a party to bring a
"private attorney general claim," where even a non-affected party
had standing to bring claims on behalf of the public at large.32 8
However, in 2004, California voters passed Proposition 64,329 which
made a number of amendments to the UCL, not the least of which
was removing the "private attorney general" provision.33 ° In
addition, departing from a decades-old practice, the proposition now
requires that the plaintiff show an injury in fact as a result of the
defendant's conduct.331 Moreover, after 2004, a UCL claimant must
satisfy section 382 class certification requirements in order to bring
any representative action under the UCL.332
Prior to Proposition 64, the requirements to bring a quasi-class
representative UCL claim were less stringent than those specified by
326. See STERN TREATISE, supra note 280, at ch. 10-C (comparing the UCL with the CLRA).
As an example, the plaintiff in Miller brought a UCL claim against Bank of America. The court
focused on how the seizure of the account holders' government benefits qualified as unlawful,
unfair and fraudulent conduct which amounted to a violation of the UCL. See Miller v. Bank of
Am. N.T. & S.A., No. CGC-99-301917, 2004 WL 3153009, at *21 (Cal. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Dec. 30, 2004) (noting that "an act or practice may be unfair, constituting a violation of the UCL,
even if it is neither unlawful nor fraudulent"). The UCL also authorizes public prosecutors to
pursue representative actions, outside the confines of section 382, against an offending party on
behalf of the general public. This provision was not affected by Proposition 64 discussed later in
this section. STERN TREATISE, supra note 280, at ch. 1.
327. STERN TREATISE, supra note 280, at ch. 10-C (noting that the CLRA provides "damages,
punitive damages, statutory damages and attorney fees," while the UCL only allows restitution
and does not provide for attorney fees).
328. Id. at ch. 7-B.
329. California utilizes a proposition system allowing the public to introduce legislation
through a ballot initiative. See 2007 Stroock Overview, supra note 290, at 1 (discussing
Proposition 64).
330. See id.
331. See STERN TREATISE, supra note 280, at ch. 7-B. In the context of claims for
misrepresentation under the UCL, a recent California Court of Appeal case, currently before the
California Supreme Court, held that the language added by Proposition 64 ("as a result of')
indicates that both the named plaintiff and the class members must have relied on a
misrepresentation. This is a departure from the traditional "likely to mislead" test that the courts
had previously employed. See Stem, supra note 325, at 4 (discussing Pfizer Inc. v. Superior
Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 840 (Ct. App. 2006), review granted, 146 P.3d 1250 (Cal. 2006)).
332. See Stem, supra note 325, at 4.
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section 382."' For example, in the case of Fletcher v. Security
Pacific NationalBank,334 a plaintiff sought to bring a class action for
breach of contract as well as a representative UCL action claiming
that the defendant engaged in an unfair trade practice by calculating
interest on the basis of a 360-day year.335 The court found that a class
action for breach of contract in which the plaintiff sought money
damages was improper because the knowledge of each customer
must be established separately for each transaction, making class
adjudication unwieldy with a class size in excess of 50,000
members. 336 However, the court held that under the UCL, it
"possesses the authority to order restitution of moneys, in the
absence of individualized proof of lack of knowledge, in order to
trade practice
preclude an entity which has engaged in an unlawful
' 337
from improperly profiting from its wrongdoing.
While California courts have a stated policy favoring class
adjudication, Proposition 64 represented at least some narrowing of
that policy by requiring that UCL claimants meet the section 382
requirements before pursuing a representative UCL claim. The
following section discusses the political environment that facilitated
the passage of Proposition 64 in a state that some assert is decidedly
pro-plaintiff.
V. CALIFORNIA'S CURRENT CLASS ACTION CLIMATE:

The modern class action has a long history, with procedural
roots dating back to the Chancery courts of equity in the seventeenth
century.338 More recently, class actions have a history of stirring up
controversy,3 39 with even small changes to procedural rules stirring
"large passions and strong rhetoric. 34 °

333. See STERN TREATISE, supra note 280, at ch. 7-B.
334. 591 P.2d51 (Cal. 1979).
335. Id. at 53.
336. Id. at 54.
337. Id.
338. See Yeazell, supra note 21, at 1067.
339. See Arthur R. Miller, Of FrankensteinMonsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and
the "ClassAction Problem, "92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979).
340. See Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA's JurisdictionalPolicy, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4, on file with author) (reflecting on his work as Special
Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules).
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Earlier sections of this Article reveal ways in which small
procedural differences can have an effect on the outcome of a
claim.3 4' This section explores whether or not California's class
action procedures and overall litigation environment justify
classifying California as a "judicial hellhole"3 42 and whether there is
sufficient support for the common belief that defendants receive
more favorable treatment in federal court. Next, this section explores
three pieces of legislation-CAFA, California's Proposition 64, and
a failed bill to amend California's class certification procedure to
more closely resemble Rule 23-in order to explore to what extent
the tides of California's litigation climate have turned. This Article
concludes that California's common law approach favoring class
action adjudication is, on the whole, being faithfully served.
A. Is California'sClass Action Litigation Environment
Decidedly Biased?
3
4
3
A recent study shows that California ranks as the fifth worst
state in the category of "Treatment of Class Action Suits and Mass
Consolidation Suits. 344 Tom Donohue, the President and CEO of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, theorized that "California's low
ranking is not surprising, given the fact that California courts are
willing to certify class action lawsuits most other jurisdictions would
toSS out.

3 45

341. See, e.g., supra Part III.A. (discussing the impact of allowing a right of a plaintiff to
appeal a death knell order denying class certification while denying the same right may have an
impact on settlement dynamics).
342. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
343. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2007: RATING THE
STATES
11
(2007),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/lawsuitclimate2007/pdf/
ClimateReport.pdf [hereinafter RATING THE STATES]. The survey was sponsored by the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The results
are based upon interviews of 1599 "in-house general counsel, senior litigators and senior
attorneys who are knowledgeable about litigation matters at companies with annual revenues of at
least $100 million." Id. at 26.
344. Id. at 11. The poll ranked California's overall litigation climate as the sixth worst in the
country, and California's jury predictability ranked as the third worst in the country. Id. at 1, 13.
345. U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Harris Poll: California, http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/harrispoll.cfm?state=CA (last visited Oct. 24, 2008)
[hereinafter Harris Poll]. The institute suggests that California has become a magnet for trial
lawyers who flock to the lawsuit-friendly state to take advantage of what they consider to be a
"broken legal system that [has] spawned a new industry-litigation tourism." U.S. Chamber
Institute
for
Legal
Reform,
California
Print
Advertisement,
http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/lawsuitclimate2007/califomia.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2008)
(referring to California as the "Sue-You State"). If California is indeed known for litigation
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Advocates at the Institute for Legal Reform suggest that such
opinions are based on observations that the California legal system
demonstrates a strong predisposition towards plaintiffs.34 ' However,
the opinions of those polled could just as easily be a reflection of the
sheer volume of litigation in California. For example, according to
one recent study, approximately 50 percent of California state-court
class action plaintiffs in 2006-2007 chose Los Angeles for venue,347
even though the Harris Poll reported Los Angeles as having the least
fair litigation environment in the country.348 The opinions could also
be skewed by publicity that surrounds high-profile litigation centered
in California.34 9 For instance, an American Tort Reform Association
("ATRA") report explained that Los Angeles was known as "the
Bank" because it was a location for plaintiffs attorneys to extract
"Astronomical Awards." 350 The ATRA report discusses awards
against Phillip Morris where individual plaintiffs were awarded
punitive damages in the amount of $3 billion in one case and $28
Though the awards were later reduced, the
billion in another.35
needs to hire a guard who
report suggests that "[t]he Bank clearly
352
will stop the looting and apply the law.
While coverage of high-profile litigation and opinion polls of
corporate counsel may have something to offer when assessing
California's class action climate, an objective determination of
whether or not California courts are "'willing to certify class action

tourism, then Los Angeles would likely be considered the biggest "tourist trap" in the country.
Los Angeles County ranks at the top of the "Least Fair and Reasonable Litigation Environment"
category. RATING THE STATES, supra note 343, at 8. This assessment addresses the county's
litigation environment as a whole and not just to class actions.
346. See Harris Poll, supra note 345 (commenting on California courts' willingness to certify
class actions that other jurisdictions would not and on California juries' tendency to award
"disproportionately large judgments in civil cases").
347. See Press Release, Civil Justice Ass'n of Cal., Class Action Lawsuits Still Abound in
California: More Than Four Filed Every Day Superior Courts Are in Session (Oct. 29, 2007),
22 7
.
available at http://www.cjac.org/publications/news/detail.cfin?HeadlinelD=1
348. Harris Poll, supra note 345.
349. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 11 (2003),
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2003/report.pdf [hereinafter 2003 ATRA REPORT].
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
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lawsuits most other jurisdictions would toss out"' 353 requires the kind

of empirical analysis that, to date, is not available.354
Nevertheless, there is a common wisdom that the federal courts
are tougher than state courts on class action palintiffs 35 5 and there
may be structural reasons-such as the resources available to a
federal judge-that may lead a class action defendant to prefer
federal court. 356 For example, a federal judge with a smaller caseload
and the invaluable resource of dedicated law clerks may have the
opportunity to delve deeper into a sophisticated area of law than her
state-court counterpart.357 In addition, members of the federal bench
may, as a whole, have more experience dealing with larger class

353. California Stuck Near Bottom in Ranking of Legal Climate, INLAND EMPIRE Bus. J.,
May 1, 2007, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa5342/is_200705/ai n21288327
(quoting Tom Donohue, President and CEO of U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
354. See CABRASER ET AL., supra note 31, § 1.03(3)(C) (lamenting "an unfortunate dearth of
published case law" involving California class certification decisions); TOM WILLG1NG & EMERY
LEE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROGRESS REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
ON THE IMPACT OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 4 (Nov. 2007), http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafal107.pdf/$file/cafall07.pdf (remarking that "reliable data on class
action activity in most state court systems simply do not exist"). A significant first step in an
empirical analysis would be to tally the state class actions filed and determine the rate of
certification as well as a determination of how likely a certified class is to settle prior to a final
judgment. A comprehensive empirical study comparing California and federal certification
practice would be difficult to say the least. A thorough study would need to cull and tally class
action certification motions and orders at the state and federal courts. In addition to calculating
the raw number of filings, the optimal study would inspect not only whether or not the class was
certified but the bases upon which class certification was made by tracking which certification
requirements were or were not satisfied.
355. Juliana Kreese & Benjamin C. Rosenbaum, The New Face of Class Action Litigation: an
Interview with Professor Tobias Barrington Wolff of UC Davis Law School, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus.
L.J. 12, 12 (2005), http:/iblj.ucdavis.edu/article.asp?id=586&print-true (noting that "[in most
places, federal courts are more skeptical than state courts about allowing class actions to
proceed").
356. Interview with David Fischer, Adjunct Professor, Loyola Law School, in L.A., Cal. (Feb.
6, 2008) (discussing the ways in which federal procedural rules are generally less forgiving than
California state court rules) [hereinafter Fischer Interview]. Federal judges are generally
perceived as tougher for a number of reasons, including the fact that their lifetime appointments
leave them less concerned, as a body, about the burdens of being reappointed. In addition, while
the state jurists are usually of a very high caliber, the appointment process to the federal bench
tends to result in a more consistently top-of-the-line caliber of jurist. Id. Moreover, federal juries
may be more universally "cosmopolitan," while state juries can, in some circumstances, be
reflective of a local neighborhood. Id.
357. Telephone Interview with Lisa M. Simonetti, Partner, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP
(Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Simonetti Interview]; Memorandum from Richard M. Heimann et al.,
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Berstein LLP on Preliminary Issues Regarding Forum Selection,
Jurisdiction,
and
Choice
of
Law
in
Class
Actions
(Dec.
1,
1999),
http://www.lieffcabraser.com/pdf/ForumSelection.pdf.
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actions and may be more familiar with the class action standards and
procedures.358
The question remains whether these or other factors actually
have an impact on the likelihood of certification in federal or state
court. One empirical study, prepared by the Federal Judicial Center
in 2005, challenged the common conception that defendants receive
generally more favorable treatment in federal court when it comes to
class certification." 9 The study found that "[i]n both federal and
state courts, cases were almost equally likely to be certified as class
actions.""36
Regardless of the availability of definitive empirical data, many
practitioners on both sides of the "v." agree that the particular judge
they draw is one variable that can have a profound impact on the
outcome of a case.361 With a relatively small community of class
action counsel, word of a few decisions that reveal a particular
jurist's inclinations can result in a disproportionate number of class
action filings before a judge that plaintiffs' attorneys believe will be
more amenable to their clients.362
With close to 1,500 judges in the California Superior Court
system,363 tracking jurists' propensities for the general assignment
pool would be rather prohibitive. However, in 2000, California
initiated a complex court system that provided a subset of judges

358. See Simonetti Interview, supra note 357; Heinmann etal., supra note 357, at 2.
359. THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS' CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
(2005), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ClAct05.pdf/$file/ClActO5.pdf.
360. Id. at 35. The study compared the two following data sets: (1) 118 cases that were
removed to federal court and then remanded back to state court; and (2) 165 cases that were
removed to federal court but not remanded. Id. It is possible that other variables are masking the
likelihood of certification in state versus federal courts (i.e., differences within the court system
such as circuit splits within the federal court system or differences in counties in the state court
system).
361. Telephone Interview with William L. Stem, Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP (Jan. 16,
2008) [hereinafter Stem Interview No. 1] (commenting that the selection or assignment of the
judge is one of the most, if not the most, important decisions or factors impacting the case);
Telephone Interview with Timothy Cohelan, Partner, Cohelan & Khoury (Feb. 6, 2008)
[hereinafter Cohelan Interview] (explaining that whether in state or federal court, the certification
process can be enormously influenced by the judge).
362. See Stem Interview No. 1, supra note 361 (discussing California state court's case
assignment system that provides plaintiffs with the ability to select the county for suit and thereby
maximize the chances of certification).
363. See California Trial Court Roster: Superior Court, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/
trial/judges.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
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with supplemental training and other resources to help them manage
the complex cases assigned to them. 3' A number of class actions in
California are referred to the program, which maintains a separate
calendaring and judicial assignment system.365 Clearly, the ability to
discern a judge's receptivity to certification becomes more valuable
in counties that only have one judge on the complex panel or where
all of the judges share the same propensities.366
Class action plaintiffs, as "masters of the complaint,"36 7 have
more say as to which venue will hear the case, and they can therefore
craft the complaint to take advantage of what they see as procedural
or substantive advantages that each venue offers. While it may be
true that some California procedures and class certification
requirements encourage class actions, 368 enforcement of. this policy
cannot in good faith be construed as an unfair or unjust application of
California's certification doctrine is sufficiently
the law.369
developed to provide a court of appeal with ample criteria to reign in
any trial court's overzealous certification. Professor Arthur Miller's
assessment is as poignant now as it was some thirty years ago: "The
sad truth is that there has been too much advocacy, making it
difficult to separate fact from fantasy.""37 Advocates who wish to
364. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION PROGRAM FACT SHEET 2

(Jan. 2007), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/factsheets/comlit.pdf [hereinafter
FACT SHEET]. For a more detailed discussion of this program, see Scott Paetty, Classless Not
Clueless: A Comparison of Case Management Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex
Litigation in Californiaand FederalCourts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 845 (2008).
365. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION PILOT PROGRAM 1-2 (2008)

http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/innovations/documents/SI-Brief ComplexCivLit.pdf.
The complex panel has some advantages of the federal courts in that the cases are heard by judges
with experience in class actions and are free from the confines of California's accelerated
timetable to facilitate speedy dispositions. See Simonetti Interview, supra note 357.
366. See Stem Interview No. 1, supra note 361. Alameda County has two judges dedicated to
the program; Contra Costa, San Francisco, and Santa Clara Counties each have one judge; Los
Angeles County has seven judges; and Orange County has five judges. See FACT SHEET, supra
note 364, at 3-4.
367. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987).
368. See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 96 P.3d 194, 209 (Cal. 2004) (noting that
"this state has a public policy which encourages the use of the class action device" (quoting
Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 30 (Cal. 1981)). "By establishing a technique
whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both
eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method of
obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation."
Id. (quoting Richmond, 629 P.2d at 27).
369. Schwartz et al., supra note 16, at 217 (discussing how the even-handed application of the
law is the "primary remedy for the problem ofjudicial hellholes").
370. Miller, supra note 339, at 665.

Spring 2008]

UNCOMMON COMMON LA W

835

limit the application of the class action device or establish further
procedural safeguards to ensure equitable treatment may be better
served by addressing the underlying policy considerations of existing
practice, rather than making unsubstantiated assertions that the
California judiciary is in some way prejudiced against corporate

defendants.
B. Recent Legislation Involving Class Action Litigation
In 2004, it was business as usual in Washington D.C., as
election-year politicking kept lawmakers from reaching an accord on
a proposed Class Action Fairness Act that would have shifted certain
state class action lawsuits to federal courts.3 ' In the same year, but
on the other side of the coast, Arnold Schwarzenegger utilized his
political clout in his first year as governor of California to back
Proposition 64, which sought to require plaintiffs to satisfy standing

and class certification requirements in order to bring a representative
action."' The eventual passage of the two pieces of legislation were
touted as a victory for corporate defendants in leveling the class
action playing field, and yet neither turned out to be a panacea for the

defendants bar.
1. California's Proposition 64: The Public Clarifies
the Public Policy
Proposition 64 was sponsored by the Civil Justice Association of
California ("CJAC"),373 which had been working for close to ten

371. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bill to Limit Some Suits Falls Victim to Politics, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2004 at A13.
372. See Howard Fine, Governor's Backing of Measures, CandidatesPuts His Clout to Test,
L.A. Bus. J., Oct. 18 2004. Governor Schwarzenegger claimed that the UCL "turns lawyers into
bounty hunters, stalking innocent small businesses that create jobs and opportunity." Mark
Martin & Lynda Gledhill, Governor Sides with Business on 2 Laws, S.F. CHRON. Sept. 11, 2004,
at B 1. Ironically, Governor Schwarzenegger invoked the UCL to file suit against an electronic
retailer for using his image in advertising and on "bobblehead" dolls of the governor armed with
an assault rifle. See Gov. Caught in Prop 64 Debate, SANTA CLARA, Oct. 7, 2004, available at
http://media.www.thesantaclara.com/media/storage/paper946/news/2004/10/07/News/GovCaught.In.Prop.64.Debate- 1628448.shtml.
373. See About the Civil Justice Association of California, http://www.cjac.org/about/
index.cfm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). The non-profit organization, which also operates a
separate political action committee, "is active in both the Legislature and the courts, working to
reduce the excessive and unwarranted litigation that increases business and government expenses,
discourages innovation, and drives up the costs of goods and services for all consumers." Id.
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While the business
years to curb "shakedown" lawsuits.374
community had awareness of and supported efforts to reform the
UCL,375 the public became aware of the issue when the Trevor Law
Group sent thousands of demand letters to small businesses offering
not to sue if they paid settlements amounting to thousands of dollars
apiece."' Another firm sent similar demand letters to hundreds of
ethnic grocery stores and nail salons, sparking public sympathy and
disdain.377 While legislators on both sides of the aisle recognized the
problem, California lawmakers still did not pass legislation to
address the issue.
The CJAC therefore introduced Proposition 64 as a ballot
initiative, but early field polls showed the measure was only
garnering 26 percent support.317

These early polls lulled the

opposition into a certain amount of complacency, but the
proposition's supporters recognized that many voters did not pay
attention to ballot initiatives until much closer to the election.379 By
the time opponents of Proposition 64 began to mobilize, all of the
available media slots had already been sold.38° Will Stern, the
principal author of Proposition 64, suggests that of all of the factors
that led to the initiative's eventual passage, Governor
Schwarzenegger's endorsement was paramount. By backing the
measure, the first-year governor put his clout to the test."' Not only
did he pass, Scwarzenegger got an "A+" as the voters passed every

374. Id. The "shakedown" lawsuits are "frivolous lawsuits ginned up by unethical plaintiffs'
attorneys seeking easy settlements." David Reyes, Business Owners Rally Around Initiative to
Limit Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES (Orange County), Sept. 16, 2004, at B3.
375. The CJAC made a number of unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation similar to
Proposition 64. See Telephone Interview with William L. Stem, Partner, Morrison & Foerster
LLP (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Stern Interview No. 2].
376. Walter Olson, The Shakedown State, WALL ST. J., Jul. 22, 2003, at A12. The letter read:
"Either pay more money to fight in court or settle out of court and get on with business." Id.
Three principles of the firm were eventually disbarred. Id.
377. Id. A local radio station broadcasted outside of the Trevor Law Group office to garner
support for passing legislation to address the extortionist lawsuits. See John and Ken Show (KFI
AM-650 radio broadcast Dec. 6, 2002), available at http://johnandkenshow.com/audio/files/
trevorprotest.wmx.
378. See Fine, supra note 372.
379. Stem Interview No. 2, supra note 375.
380. Id.
381. See Fine, supra note 372.
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proposition that he endorsed and rejected every measure he
382

opposed.

After Proposition 64, a plaintiff must now show that she
suffered an injury in fact from the alleged wrongdoing. 3 Because
the "private attorney general" provision was removed, a plaintiff who
wishes to bring a representative action must comply with the
requirements of section 382."' While these and other modifications
to the UCL were seen as key victories to help curb frivolous
lawsuits,385 the proposition also provided one point of clarity that
favored plaintiffs. Some cases before Proposition 64 suggested that
a section 382 class action would not be proper for a UCL claim
because the UCL had its own provisions for representative actions
and because section 382 classes did not require substantial benefits to
the court and litigants.386 By codifying the authorization to bring a
UCL claim as a class action and requiring that the plaintiff has
suffered an injury in fact, Proposition 64 may have decreased the
number of UCL lawsuits but ensured that those filed are more
potent.387
2. Other Attempts to Limit Class Actions in California
Have Not Been Successful
While Governor Schwarzenegger's support of Proposition 64 in
2004 may have been pivotal,388 his support of later efforts to modify
California's class action procedure389 did not have the same impact.39 °
382. Jordan Rau, Key Ballot Measures Go Governor's Way, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at Al.
A number of newspapers also endorsed Proposition 64 which, Mr. Stern suggests, may not have
occurred without the governor's support. See Stern Interview No. 2, supra note 375.
383. See Memorandum from William L. Stern, Attorney at Law, Severson & Werson, to John
H. Sullivan, President, Civil Justice Ass'n of Cal. (Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.cjac.org/legislation/
prop64/what64does.pdf.
384. See supra Part lI.B.
385. See Memorandum from William L. Stern, supra note 383.
386. See Frieman v. San Rafael Rock Quarry, Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82, 91 (Ct. App. 2004);
Kavruck v. Blue Cross of Cal., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 161-62 (Ct. App. 2004); see also infra Part
ll.B.
387. Telephone Interview with Kimberly A. Kralowec, Partner, Schubert Jonckheer Kolbe &
Kralowec LLP (Jan. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Kralowec Interview].
388. See supra Part V.B.1.
389. See Press Release, Civil Justice Ass'n of Cal., Governor Schwarzenegger Announces
Support for Class Action Reform Bill (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.cjac.org/
publications/news/detail.cfm? HeadlinelD = 1215.
390. See Cal. Chamber of Commerce, LegislatorsHalt Class Action Reform Bill (May 11,
2007), http://www.calchamber.com/CC/Headlines/Archive/PublicAffairsPolitics/2007/
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Assemblywoman Nicole Parra introduced a bill, sponsored by the

CJAC, that proposed bringing California's class action certification
requirements and related procedures closer to Rule 23."9' In addition
to eliminating "any presumption or policy in favor of class
certification, '39 2 the bill sought to make other changes to class
certification procedures that are not present in,
Rule 23, not the least

of which was allowing a defendant the right to appeal an order
granting class certification.393 Having learned their lesson after Prop.
64, Democratic advocates recognized that "[w]hile progressives were

394
asleep at the switch on Prop 64 we can no longer afford to rest.
Consumer protection advocates launched prompt opposition to AB
1505,395 which, at least in part, led to the bill dying in committee.396

Undaunted by the setback, the CJAC continues to introduce
legislation aimed at reducing "excessive and unwarranted
litigation, '397 including sponsoring a bill that would allow both the
plaintiff and defendant the right to immediately appeal an order
certifying or decertifying a class. 39' The tensions between the
business groups and consumer advocacy groups are likely to
continue into the future, and only time will tell if business interests
can garner sufficient support to change what consumer advocacy

05112007TS.htm (noting that a motion for the committee to vote on AB 1505 "did not proceed
for lack of a second").
391. See A.B. 1505, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
392. Id.
393. See AB
1505
Dies
in
Committee,
WAGE
LAW,
May
9,
2007,
http://wagelaw.typepad.com/wagelaw/2007/05/ab1505dies in.html (last visited May 31,
2007) (discussing the differences between the existing California law and the proposed changes
under AB 1505).
394. Posting of Brian Leubitz, AB1505: A Direct Attack upon Consumers: Class-Action
Obfuscation, Calitics, (May 24, 2007 11:15 PDT), http://califomiafordemocracy.net/abl505direct-attack-upon-consumers-class-action-obfuscation.
395. See Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, NACA Joins in Opposing Any Attempt to Gut
California's
Consumer
Protection
Laws,
http://www.naca.net/News-Events/
News.aspx?item=29589 (last visited May 2, 2007) (reprinting a letter addressed to the
Chairperson of California's Judiciary Committee from various consumer and environmental
protection groups urging opposition to AB 1505).
396. See AB 1505 Dies in Committee, supra note 393; California Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 390.
397. Civil Justice Association of California, http://www.cjac.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
398. See Press Release, Civil Justice Ass'n of Cal., Bill Would Allow Both Sides Opportunity
to
Appeal
Class
Certification
(Feb.
12,
2008),
available
at
http:l/
www.cjac.orglpublications/news/detail.cfm?HeadlinelD= 1252.
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groups consider to be an unbroken system that is not in need of
fixing.399
3. The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act.
After the passage of CAFA in 2005400 in which "Congress threw
open the doors of the federal court and invited complex state litigants
to enter,"4 1 early reports indicate that some litigants are accepting
Congress's invitation. The most recent report from the Federal
Judicial Council showed a "marked increase in the number of
diversity cases filed in or removed to the federal courts in the postCAFA period."4 2 The increase in federal class action activity could
be the result of CAFA's expanded federal jurisdiction, or it could
also be a reflection of an overall increase in class action activity.4 3
Another study, commissioned by the CJAC and conducted by
O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, studied class action filings across six
California counties.4 "4 This report indicated that despite the passage
of CAFA, the volume of class action filings in California state courts
actually increased slightly in recent years-with 1,093 class actions
filed in 2004-2005, 1,180 filed in 2005-2006, and 1,156 class action

399. See Rachele R. Rickert, Class Actions: There Is No Reason to Fix What Isn't Broken,
ABTL REP. (Ass'n of Bus. Trial Law., San Diego, Cal.), Summer 2007, at 4, 15 available at
http://www.abtl.org/report/sd/abtl-report-summer-2007.pdf (arguing that California's class action
law is sufficiently developed and allows the court the flexibility it needs to exercise California's
strong public policy in favor of class action adjudication). "[W]hile no reform is necessary, any
reforms to California's class action procedures must be carefully crafted so that the benefits of
class action litigation are not destroyed or significantly delayed." Id.
400. Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). Previous versions of CAFA had been presented to Congress but did not garner sufficient
support. However, "[t]he 2004 election gave [President Bush] a temporary boost in, as he put it,
his 'political capital' .... " Kreese & Rosenbaum, supra note 355, at 12. After the election in
2004 the Republican party had "the political strength in the Senate to push it through, and so they
did." Id.
401. Nicole Ochi, Are Consumer Class and Mass Actions Dead? Complex Litigation
StrategiesAfter CAFA & MMTJA, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 972 (2008). For an analysis of the
jurisdictional policy underlying CAFA, see Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA 's Stated
JurisdictionalPolicy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
402. See TOM WILLGING & EMERY LEE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROGRESS REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON THE IMPACT OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 4
(2007), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafal 107.pdf/$file/cafal 107.pdf.
403. Id.
404. Press Release, Civil Justice Ass'n of Cal., supra note 347. The information gleaned
from the docket was supplemented by an inspection of the actual complaints filed as well as
information provided by local bar associations and commercial vendors. Id.
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complaints filed in 2006-2007.45 Therefore, it may be that CAFA
has led to an increase in class actions being heard in federal court
and that there is an increase in overall class action filings in both
federal and state courts.
Another possible factor is that class action plaintiffs are
choosing to file in federal courts to avoid the expense and delay of
the battles over removal and remand. 46 The plaintiff who originally
files in federal court can choose the "district court within the circuit
that they view as having favorable procedural and legal rules,
geographic connection to the litigation, or judges that they perceive
to be predisposed to rule in favor of class certification.""4 7
A defendant may also not always wish to remove a case to
federal court. Given the availability of a separate complex court
system in certain California counties, a defendant may prefer to stay
in state court before an experienced judge with a track record of
even-handedness, rather than taking a chance by removing to federal
court before an unknown judge who may turn out to be less friendly
to the defendant's interests.4°8
However, where CAFA's jurisdictional requirements are
satisfied and the defendant is so motivated, CAFA does provide the
defendant with the expected benefit of being able to remove the case
as a way out of a "judicial hellhole.""4 9 CAFA also provides a
defendant with an opportunity to seek a federal judge who may have
a defendant-friendly (or at least friendlier) predilection."' Federal
courts may be more receptive to a federal preemption defense, and
defendants may prefer a slower, more protracted litigation timeline
405. Id. Forty-seven percent of the class actions filed were employment matters. Id. Many
of the "Wage and Hour" class actions are not deemed complex and are therefore subject to the
general assignment process rather than the complex litigation panel. See Cohelan Interview, supra
note 361.
406. See Telephone Interview with Richard L. Marcus, Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litig.,
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law (Jan. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Marcus Interview].
407. Emery G. Lee IlI & Thomas E. Willging, Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal
Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
(manuscript at 26, on file with author).
408. Simonetti Interview, supra note 357. For an example of a state court system that has
become generally less amenable to the plaintiffs interests, see Stephen Burbank, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
409. See supra Part V.A (discussing some ways in which the experience and resources of the
federal judge may be desirable to the corporate defendant).
410. See id. (discussing the impact that assignment of a particular judge can have on a case).
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employed by some federal courts, compared to a "fast-track"
docketing sometimes demanded by state courts.4 1' Moreover, the
federal rules of evidence and procedure may, in some circumstances,
inure to the benefit of the defendant.1 2
Setting aside whether defendants actually do receive more
favorable treatment in federal court than in state court,413 Professor
Richard Marcus points out that the judiciary is not a static entity,4 14
and notes:
There is no particular reason to assume the enduring
attractiveness for business interests of federal-court views
on class certification and related matters, compared to statecourt views, so one possible result of CAFA's jurisdictional
policy would be to empower federal courts of the future to
become more creative in favor of class-action treatment
than they have in the past. That impulse might be furthered
by the Congressional acknowledgement in CAFA that class
actions are a valuable technique for aggregating claims.4 15
Professor Marcus notes that it is difficult to predict who the
"winner" and "loser" will be as a result of procedural changes. 416 If
history is any indication, changes to procedure that are believed to
strongly favor defendants may, over time, actually favor plaintiffs.4 7
411. See Simonetti Interview, supra note 357.
412. For example, federal judges tend to be stricter in adherence to procedural rules, whereas
California judges, in certain circumstances, must accommodate an attorney's excusable neglect or
inadvertence. See Fischer Interview, supra note 356 (discussing CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 473(b)
(Deering 2007)). Defense counsel who is more readily familiar with the federal courts may
therefore have an advantage over counsel who is more familiar with California state practice.
413. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class
Action Litigation: What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 593 (2005)
("Although generally accepted among attorneys, there is little empirical evidence supporting the
belief that state and federal courts differ generally in their treatment of class actions.").
414. See Marcus Interview, supra note 406 (suggesting that a change in the political climate
in Washington could lead to different appointments to the federal bench that, in turn, could make
the federal court more desirable for plaintiffs). Indeed, we may be seeing a shift in the Texas
state courts, where, according to Professor Stephen Burbank, the courts have made class
certification more difficult than in many circuit courts. See Burbank, supra note 408, at 17 n.70
(citing Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007)).
415. Marcus, supra note 340, at 6.
416. Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospectsfor ProceduralProgress,
59 Brook L. Rev. 761, 789 (1993) ("Although the 1966 perspective might have been that a
number of 'establishment defendants' would blanch at the increased availability of class actions,
the perspective a quarter century later is not so one-sided. Some defendants may view class
actions as an important tool to deal with widespread liability.").
417. Id.
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For example, CAFA's settlement approval provisions require that
defendants provide notice of a proposed settlement to the appropriate
state and federal official.418 Therefore, it is possible that after the
parties have engaged in protracted negotiations, a federal or state
regulator could object to the settlement or bring a separate
investigation. 419 This notice provision is hardly pro-defendant as an
investigation could lead to additional exposure subsequent to any
investigation.4 20
In addition to providing procedural safeguards to ensure class
settlements are equitable, 2 ' CAFA's proponents argued that federal
jurisdiction over multi-state class actions was necessary to place "the
determination of more interstate class action lawsuits in the proper
forum-the federal courts. 4 22 Others argue that CAFA is an
unabashed effort at "forum shopping because defendants believe they
will improve their chances of success markedly in class actions if
'
they are in federal courts."423
As Professor Marcus suggests, "[o]bjections that CAFA is prodefendant may also be overtaken by events. As the academic flipflop on preferences for litigating in federal court between the 1970s
424
and the present illustrates, current preferences may change.
Therefore, the question remains whether California's flexible
common law approach is fundamentally different than the statutory
framework that is allegedly more defendant-friendly.
C. California'sUncommon Class Action
Under Common Law
In his book exploring how the common law can respond to and
contribute to social change, Oliver Wendell Holmes his position as
follows:
Every important principle which is developed by litigation
is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely

418. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2005).
419. Simonetti Interview, supra note 357.
420. Id.
421. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5-6.
422. Id. at 5 (2005), as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6.
423. Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle
the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1521, 1523 (2005).
424. Marcus, supra note 340, at 33 (footnote omitted).
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understood views of public policy; most generally, to be
sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious
result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate
convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public
4 25

policy.

The bulk of this Article has addressed the specific procedural
differences between Rule 23 and section 382. Perhaps the one
overarching difference is that California's approach under section
382 is a common law scheme that provides judges with increased
flexibility and freedom to exercise California's long-standing
preference for, and protection of, the utilization of class actions.426
Certainly, "California class action practice is dynamic," and the
courts have been actively involved in that dynamism.

27

Even if

California were to codify its class action procedure "into a series of
seemingly self-sufficient propositions, those propositions [would] be
' Like many human endeavors,
but a phase in a continuous growth."428
"the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. "429
VI. CONCLUSION

Class action litigation can instill thoughts of Frankenstein
monsters or knights in shining armor, and class action counsel can be
425. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 32 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Belknap Press 1963) (1881).
426. See Stem Interview No. 1, supra note 361 (commenting that California is one of less
than a hand-full of states who have not codified their class action procedures either by statute or
by rules of civil procedure, and noting that a common law system tends to be more
accommodating to change). By way of comparison, a majority of states across the country have
adopted Rule 23, and all but three have codified their class action law. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
427. CABRASER, supra note 38, § 1.03(c) (commenting on how the California courts "have
been prolific in this area"). Ms. Cabraser, in discussing whether courts should make an initial
inquiry into the merits of a case prior to certification, comments that:
[A]n adversary system depends upon the clash of competing advocacy and
evidence to reach a balanced truth, practitioners for defendants opposing
certification would do well to remind the court that the aggregation of
worthless or trivial claims into a class action juggernaut may threaten
corporate survival, if there is no call for harsh punishment and no
misfeasance to punish or deter.
Id. (citing Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 419, 425-27 (Ct. App. 1993)). Ms.
Cabraser goes on to suggest that "[p]laintiffs' advocates can counter such arguments by
mustering facts early and demonstrating that a particular case conforms with, rather than
confounds, California policies of fairness to producers and consumers alike." Id.
428. HOLMES, supra note 425, at 32.
429. Id.
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vilified as "bounty hunters

'430
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or held out as vindicators of the rights

of the masses. Regardless of the hyperbole, "class actions in
California are alive and well. 43' In either the statutory or common
law scheme, the road to salvation for a judicial hellhole may indeed
lie with the "fair and just application of the rules of law.

'431

In

California, even if unbound by a statutory framework, courts
continue to respect the entrenched history of representative
adjudication while safeguarding its legitimacy so that equity is
served to all who come before the court.

430. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action
and OtherLarge Scale Litigation, II DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 196 (2001).
431. See Kralowec Interview, supra note 387.
432. Schwartz et al., supra note 16, at 217.

